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Abstract
This dissertation presents a model of strategic issue management that
focuses on the mediational role that interpretation has between monitoring
and scanning the environment and organizational response.
concerning the relationships between several dimensions

Hypotheses
of issue

interpretation and several dimensions of organizational issue response are
posited.

The strategic issue of consumer nutrition awareness within the

restaurant industry is targeted, and a research methodology constructed for
testing the hypotheses.

Urgency, Understanding, and Capability all had

significant relationships with the response variables of Magnitude, Locus,
and Activeness, with Understanding's relationship tending to be curvilinear.
No variables had a significant effect on Immediacy, though this was
probably due to methodology constraints. The potential contributions and
implications of these findings for theory and managerial practice are
presented and discussed, as are ideas for future research.

vi
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
An emerging topic of concern in the strategic management literature
involves how organizations respond to unexpected or newly emerging
situations, be they strategic issues, social issues or competitor moves (i.e.,
Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Wartick & Cochran, 1985; Smith, Grimm, Gannon, &
Chen, 1991). This is an important arena of inquiry since a frequent question
in these separate streams of literature concerns the factors that influence
organizational response.
Strategic control concerns scanning the environment in order to
detect and respond to emerging issues that might endanger the strategic
course of action and threaten performance, or that may represent
opportunities that could be exploited (Schendel & Hofer, 1979; Lorange, ScottMorton, & Ghoshal, 1986; Schreyogg & Steinmann, 1987).

In general, it is

preferable to detect such issues as early as possible, when signals are still
"weak" (Ansoff, 1975), to allow for longer response times.

Since the

interpretation of a particular environmental issue as, for example, an
opportunity or a threat, to a significant extent can determine what the
response of the organization will be (Ford & Baucus, 1987; Dutton & Jackson,
1987), to understand the interpretation process is to gain understanding of
not only strategic control, but organizational strategy and strategic change,
as well. Thus, the way in which organizations interpret strategic issues and
the factors that influence this interpretation process emerge as topics of
considerable importance (Daft & Weick, 1984).
Role of Issue Management
Issue management involves monitoring the internal and external
environments in order to detect and formulate responses to emerging
developments that may impact the organization. Issue management can be

1
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found in the strategic management, strategic control, and corporate social
responsibility literatures.

A brief review of the concept of issue

management in each of these areas serves to demonstrate the theoretical
ubiquity, and by extension, importance, of issue management.
Strategic management. The relationship of issue management with
the strategic management literature can be examined by considering its
similarity within three schools of strategic management thought: the
traditional "design" school; the "learning" school; and the "positioning"
school (Mintzberg, 1990).
In more traditional views of strategic management, scanning was
often viewed as a single step in a formal, synoptic process

whereby

organizational strategies were rationally formulated (for a review of some of
these see Digman, 1986). Organizations scanned their environments in an
attempt to identify opportunities and threats that would be used as a partial
basis for the organization's strategy (Andrews, Learned, Christensen, & Guth,
1965; Andrews, 1971). While not explicitly identifying issue management as a
critical part of the process, included in this deliberate, design-oriented view
was a recognition of the need to assess and respond to certain factors in the
environment.
Other approaches have been taken to strategic management, such as
the idea that strategies can emerge on their own as organizations learn
(Mintzberg, 1990; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985).

In this framework, strategies

can sprout up unintendedly, like "weeds in a garden" as organizations face
and respond to new situations (Mintzberg & McHugh, 1985). The process of
issue management is almost synonymous with that of strategy formation in
this perspective, although this has not been made explicit.

Issue
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management could thus be viewed as one way strategies emerge and change
over time as the organization faces and responds to different issues.
Also, increasing attention has been paid to competitive rivalry and the
responses of organizations to the actions of their competitors as part of what
Mintzberg (1990) termed the positioning school (Porter, 1980, 1985). Here,
issues are represented by the competitive moves of a rival organization and
the research in this area has focused on the factors that influence what the
response will be (Chen, Smith, & Grimm, 1992; Smith, et. al., 1991). While the
stress in the design approach is on scanning, and that of the learning
approach is on strategy emergence over time, the positioning approach
focuses on responding to discrete and easily identifiable events and has
yielded some explicit findings that will be reviewed later.
It should be stressed that in all three of these examples of different
schools of thought in strategic management, issue management is present at
least implicitly, and in some cases very explicitly.
Strategic control. Within the area of strategic management, the topic
of strategic control relates even more strongly to issue management than the
literature on strategy formation.

Although a relatively neglected topic in

the past (Shrivistava, 1987), strategic control has been the center of
increasing attention (Schreyogg & Steinmann, 1987; Lorange, 1988; Goold &
Quinn, 1990; Preble, 1992). The concept of strategic control has been refined
since Schendel and Hofer (1979) identified it as an important area in
strategic management.
Strategic control is pictured at three levels: implementation control,
where the implementation of the strategy is monitored; premise control,
where critical success factors are monitored; and strategic surveillance,
which is the broad-based monitoring of the environment for significant
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developments (Schreyogg & Steinmann, 1987; Preble, 1992). The strategic
surveillance component is essentially synonymous with issue management,
since it involves scanning for developments that may have a significant
impact on the organization's strategy (Schreyogg & Steinmann,

1987).

Implementation and premise control are conceptualized as narrowing the
focus of the organization and strategic surveillance, i.e., issue management,
is required so that an organization will not be blind-sided by an
unanticipated development (Preble, 1992).
The literature on strategic control is still primarily prescriptive and
lacking in theoretical development (Schreyogg & Steinmann, 1987).

Given

its overlap with strategic control, empirical research on issue management
represents one avenue toward strengthening this area.
Corporate social responsibility. Issue management has represented an
important component of corporate social responsibility models for some time
(Carroll, 1979; Wartick & Cochran, 1985; Wood, 1991a, 1991b).

Issue

management is pictured as one of the processes an organization can engage
in to be socially responsive (Ackerman, 1975; Wood, 1991b). The issues that
the organization should manage in this case emanate from the social
environment, and the manner and immediacy of the organization's response
has been viewed as a litmus test on the organization's social responsiveness
(Carroll, 1979).
Issue management has also been influenced by the area of public
relations, where much of the early research on issue management occurred
(Chase, 1977).

The actual practice of issue management, as well as its

conceptual development, has reached its fullest expression in the area of
public affairs and public relations (Chase, 1984; Heath & Nelson, 1986). This
is to be expected since public affairs is concerned with gathering
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intelligence on the social (i.e. non commercial) environment and the
developm ent

of action

plans

directed

toward

this

environm ent

(Nagelschmidt, 1982). While public relations is primarily concerned with the
use of communication to maintain a corporation's image, and public affairs
tends to focus on governmental activity, issue management was pictured as a
way to combine social policy with business policy (Heath & Nelson, 1986;
Wood, 1991b).
It is also possible to include work in the institutional tradition (Meyer
& Rowan, 1977; Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1977), or at least an
extension of it, in the area of issue management in social responsibility.
Oliver (1991) demonstrates how organizations in different circumstances
respond to institutional pressures by combining institutional thought with
ideas from the resource dependence school (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Oliver
provides an elaborate list of institutional antecedents and the impact that
each of these may have on the types of responses an organization might
make, ranging from acquiescence to manipulation (1991).
Issue management has been cited as one area in corporate social
responsibility needing further research (Wood, 1991b).

Thus, given that

issue management relates to strategic management, strategic control, and
corporate social responsibility, research in the area of strategic issue
management has potential relevance in a wide range of areas.
Attention now turns to the focus of this dissertation, strategic issue
management. Strategic issue management (SIM), while having similar roots
to some of the areas above, has a slightly divergent path of development.
This will be demonstrated by tracing the academic and

conceptual

development of strategic issue management, and by giving evidence of the
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commonality of SIM with the other types of issue management discussed
above through a brief discussion of its use in practice.
Development and Roots of Strategic Issue Management
Academic management. Managing strategic issues was first discussed
within the context of how to avoid strategic surprises (Ansoff, 1975). This
could be accomplished by scanning for "weak signals" in the external
environment and responding to them while there was still time to be
proactive.

Ansoff suggested that at first the response should be small in

scale, in keeping with the equivocality of a weak signal.

As the signal

strengthened, however, the organization's response should grow in
magnitude. Ansoff (1980) offered a more robust conceptualization of SIM by
examining its strong signal and weak signal forms and included a graphic
model of the relationship between forecast horizon and response time.

He

also stressed the superiority of SIM over periodic strategic management
systems. A similar approach appeared in King (1982) where a process model
of strategic issue analysis was explicated.
An important conceptual advance was made in Dutton, Fahey, and
Narayanan (1983). Their focus was on a part of SIM, strategic issue diagnosis,
whereby stimuli are ordered into issues and interpretation occurs.

They

presented a three-stage, recursive model containing inputs, processes, and
outputs.

The recognition that interpretation plays a part in SIM was a

significant contribution, and much of the literature on SIM has included
interpretation as an important component.

Also significant was the

suggestion that inputs other than characteristics of the issue itself would be
important, for example cognitive maps and political interests.
Dutton and her associates continued to make contributions in the area
of SIM. The overall SIM system was the focus of Dutton and Ottensmeyer
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(1987). Relating the strategic issue literature to that from public affairs and
relations and building on the interpretational model of Daft and Weick
(1984), Dutton and Ottensmeyer developed a typology of SIM systems
according to the source of the issue (internal versus external) and the
activity scope (active versus passive).

The symbolic, as opposed to

instrumental, aspects of SIM systems were explored, as well. SIM systems
were pictured as helping organizations better adapt to their environments,
and so Dutton and Ottensmeyer also included propositions concerning the
effect of the environment on SIM.
Dutton and Duncan (1987) continued the previous focus on strategic
issue diagnosis by exploring how certain organizational factors influence
issue interpretation and on how the kinds of issue interpretations made
influence the momentum for change. Issues are diagnosed and interpreted
according to their urgency and the feasibility of making a response to them.
As an issue is seen to be more urgent or a response to it more feasible, the
momentum for change is greater.
Dutton and Jackson (1987) examined the categorization of issues into
opportunities or threats and explored the factors that would lead to either
interpretation. Issues that are controllable, positive or represent a potential
gain are likely to be viewed as opportunities, for example.

Propositions

concerning the effects of certain process characteristics on interpretation
were forwarded, and the impact of interpretation on issue response explored.
The last two articles represented a turn of attention away from the overall
system and toward the interpretationa! /diagnostic aspects of SIM. This focus
has been continued in other work.
For example, Dutton, Walton, and Abrahamson (1989) empirically
investigated the dimensions that decision makers use to sort strategic issues
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and found that those dimensions proposed by theory were not necessarily the
ones used in practice. Jackson and Dutton (1988) studied the types of factors
that were associated with the labels of opportunity and threat and found that
decision makers were more sensitive to issues labeled "threats" as opposed to
issues labeled "opportunities." Thomas and McDaniel (1990) examined the
effect that strategy and information processing characteristics have on issue
interpretation and found significant relationships with both.

Sallivan and

Nonaka (1988) looked for and found a relationship between national culture
and issue interpretation.
Some recent empirical work in the SIM area has examined the impact
of interpretation on response, as well. Dutton, Stumpf, and Wagner (1990)
investigated the effect of issue interpretation on the allocation of resources
and found some significant relationships. Support was also found for some of
the propositions for change posited in Dutton and Duncan (1987) related to
urgency, feasibility, and momentum. The impact of national culture on both
interpretation and issue response was found to be significant in Schneider
and de Meyer (1991). These researchers also developed a multi-level model of
other contextual influences on interpretation as well as response. Finally, in
what represented a significant empirical advance in the SIM area, Dutton
and Dukerich (1991) outlined how the organizational context influenced the
development and interpretation of an actual strategic issue.

Previous

empirical work had used case studies while this research used a qualitative
approach and an examination of how a single organization reacted to a
developing strategic issue over time.
From a process or stage-related approach in its infancy, the SIM
literature began to examine particular parts of the SIM process. For example,
the diagnosis and interpretation of strategic issues as well as the
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organization's response to those issues is now the current focus of the
academic SIM field. This dissertation will make its contribution along these
lines by examining the interpretations and responses of organizations
within an industry to an emergent strategic issue.
Practice. The development of SIM within academia has been relatively
isolated from other streams of inquiry, except strategic management.

This

has not been the case in the practice of SIM, however, which has been very
closely involved with public affairs (Dutton & Ottensmeyer, 1987).

The

origins of public issue management go back to the turn of the century
(Heath & Nelson, 1986). Organizations from time to time were forced to deal
with issues emerging from the social sector of their business environment
and responded to them through various means, ranging from some very
defensive-reactionary (Carroll, 1979) responses to what could be called
"proactive" attempts to sway public opinion (Heath & Nelson, 1986: 55-59).
These early responses involved advance agents, lobbyists, press agents, and
publicity bureaus (Ewing, 1982).
The situation was to continue in this mode for some time, even through
the turbulent 1960s and 1970s. It was during this time that organizational
legitimacy was widely questioned due to various significant public issues
such as pollution, product and worker safety, corporate power and
discrimination (Steiner & Steiner, 1988).

By the mid-1970s, after years of

dealing with an increasingly harsh social environment, issue management
emerged at the overlap of the two separate functions of public relations and
strategic planning (Ewing, 1982).

It was pictured as the relating of the

public policy area to the business policy one, as the taking of a more
proactive stance toward issues that often were viewed only as problems and
never as opportunities (Chase, 1984). It has been said, however, that the new
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10
"issue management" was really nothing more than a new phrase for what
had been going on in public relations for some time (Ehling & Hesse, 1982).
The precipitation of interest in issue management during the 1970s
was largely due to Howard Chase, who coined the phrase, was active in
promoting this "new" idea, and formed the Issues Management Association in
1982, which had over 400 members by the mid-1980s (Dutton & Ottensmeyer,
1987). The increased exposure of this idea has led to increased corporate
interest to implement issue management systems.

In the form they are

usually discussed, these systems are synonymous with SIM systems, in that
they identify emerging trends likely to affect the organization and develop a
wider and more positive range of responses to them (Coates, Coates, Jarratt, &
Heinz, 1986). Some recent trends in practice have been the willingness of
higher-level executives to get involved with managing issues instead of
leaving it to issue managers, and the tendency of different organizations to
cooperate on a collective response to public issues (Littlejohn, 1986).
Thus, SIM and public issues management are quite similar in practice
and can be thought of as synonymous. The primary difference is that SIM is
somewhat broader in conception, and can be thought of as the general model
of which public issues management is a special case.
Summary
Issue management was presented as having influence on several areas
of management theory. It has either a direct or indirect impact on strategic
management, strategic control, and corporate social responsibility.

It was

argued that strategic issue management is an area worthy of further study
since the potential findings related to it can affect several different streams
of literature simultaneously. Then the conceptual roots and development of
SIM were traced, starting with AnsofPs seminal works on the subject. This
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review demonstrated a shifting focus from the overall system, to response
times, to the importance of interpretation and diagnosis, and finally, to the
impact of interpretation on response.
subject of this dissertation.

This last area was identified as the

Then it was demonstrated that while the

conceptual development of SIM was relatively autonomous of other areas of
issue management, in practice it is difficult to differentiate SIM from public
issue management. It was suggested that SIM could be viewed as a general
model of issue management, while public issue management would appear as
a special case, given its focus on the social sector of the environment.
Organization of Remaining Chanters
Chapter 1 established issue management as an important area.

In

Chapter 2, a more thorough review of the literature is made related to SIM
models,

the importance of interpretation,

and the literatu re

on

organizational responses to different kinds of events

This chapter concludes

with a model of issue interpretation and response.

In Chapter 3, specific

hypotheses describing the relationship between interpretation and response
are posited. Chapter 4 contains the methodological design for testing them.
Data analysis and results are presented in Chapter 5, and Chapter 6
summarizes the significance of the findings and explores their implications
for practice, theory, and future research.
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Chapter 2 - Strategic Issue Management
Models and Related Literature
This chapter begins with a review of models of the strategic issue
management process, with particular focus on the stages of interpretation
and response. The important role that interpretation plays in the process is
then discussed and a review of the different streams of literature that address
organizational responses included. Then, a model of issue interpretation and
response is presented.

A brief summary of the relationship between issue

interpretation and response closes the chapter.
Strategic Issue Management Models
Strategic issue management is the interpretational process whereby
organizations identify, analyze, and respond to strategic issues.

Strategic

issues are emerging developments that can have a major impact on the
organization's strategy (Daft & Weick, 1984; Ansoff, 1980; Dutton &
Ottensmeyer, 1987).

(This definition, as well as others relevant to this

dissertation, are listed in Appendix A.) Various models of issue management
and SIM have been suggested over the years, most of them containing the
three stages of identification, analysis, and response suggested above. Table
1 contains a summary of the following review.
To highlight the interpretational nature of SIM activity, Daft and
Weick (1984) are included in Table 1 first. They presented organizations as
interpretation systems and modeled the behavior of organizations as
following a three-step process: scanning, where data are collected;
interpretation, where data are given meaning; and learning, where action is
taken. These three steps line up with the three SIM steps of identification,
analysis, and response.

Although other models have used different

terminology, it is possible to demonstrate the correspondence of most of the

12
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Table 1 - Summary of Strategic Issue Management Models
Identification

Analysis

Response

Daft & Weick (1984)

Scanning

Interpretation

Learning

Ansoff (1980)

Monitoring
-SWOT

Assessment
-Impact
-Urgency

Issue Assignment
-Do Nothing
-Monitor
-Immediate Action
-Delayed Action

King (1982)

Identification

Model Development

Coates, et. al. (1983)

Identification
Scanning
Monitoring
Tracking

Analysis
Prioritize

Path Assignment
-Policy Path
-Strategic Path

Chase (1984)

Identification

Analysis
Change Options

Issue Program

Dutton, et. al. (1983)

Table 1 continued -

Inputs
-Cognitive Maps
-Political Interests
-Issue
Characteristics

Process
-Recursivenss
-Retroductivity
-Heterarchy

Outputs
-Assumptions
-Cause-Effect
Relationships
-Predictive
Judgments
-Labels

^
OJ

Identification
Dutton & Duncan
(1987)

Activation
-Gap Analysis
-Stakeholder
Demands

Dutton, et. al. (1990)

Analysis
Assessment
-Urgency
-Feasibility

Diagnosis Outcome
-Response
Magnitude

Perceptions
Assessments

Resource
Investment
-Time
-Priority
-Money
Strategic Action

Thomas & McDaniel
(1990)

Organizational
Context
Cognitive Processes

Interpretation

Milliken (1990)

Organizational
Characteristics

Interpretation

Schneider &
De Meyer (1991)

Context
-Individual
-Group
-Organizational
-Environmental

Interpretation

Table 1 continued

Response

Response

Identification

Analysis

Response

Dutton & Jackson
(1987)

Categorization

Organizational
Action
-Processes
-Response Target
-Response Magnitude

Dutton & Dukerich
(1991)

Organizational
Image &
Identity

Response

Note: Model components are placed under the stage where they most appropriately fit.
indicates that construct is a dimension of identification, analysis, or response.

A hyphen before a word
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following models with this three-stage interpretation process.

Frequent

consultation of Table 1 through the reading of this section will support this
assertion.
Ansoff (1980) pictured SIM as beginning with monitoring. Trends in
the external and internal environments, as well as performance trends, are
tracked continuously. The SWOT framework (Andrews, 1971; Ansoff, 1965;
Hofer & Schendel, 1978) is applied to data from these sources to identify
strategic issues. Based on an assessment as to the issues' potential impact and
urgency, an issue assignment is made, where management makes a decision
on what action to take. The responses in Ansoff's model are taking no action
at all, continuing to monitor the issue, taking delayed action, and taking
immediate action.
King (1982) narrowed the focus somewhat in that he did not explicitly
include a response step.

Starting with identification of the issue, a formal

statement of the issue is developed, followed by the development of a model
describing the issue and its potential impact and development.

This issue

model, representing the output of strategic issue analysis, is then used in the
regular planning process of the organization. This model seems to place SIM
in an overly-subservient role in relation to the periodic planning process, a
role that Ansoff would probably dispute (1975, 1980).
An alternative view of issue management was presented in Coates, et.
al. (1986).

Here the process begins with issue identification followed by

continued scanning, monitoring, and tracking.

The information is then

analyzed and priorities are set as to which issues are most important. Based
on these priorities, the issues are assigned to either a policy or strategic
implementation path, depending on the lead-time of the response.

Here
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again SIM is viewed as subservient to planning, with the output of the
process being a priority ranking.
Chase (1984) presented a view of SIM as relatively autonomous, in
keeping with his stress of the importance of this "new" function.

The

process begins with issue identification, the consideration of trends that lead
to issues. In the second step, issue analysis, the issues are researched and
various theories are forwarded to account for them.

The third step, issue

change strategy options, is where priorities are set and response plans are
selected. Steps two and three fit within analysis and interpretation in Table
1. The fourth stage represents the development of the issue action program
to support the selected issue responses.

Periodic planning in this model is

viewed as supportive of SIM.
Much of the later work on SIM models has built on Ansoff's (1980)
model. In these later models, SIM as autonomous from periodic planning and
the existence of an interpretation-like stage have been taken as given.
anything,

the

focus has narrowed

somewhat,

centering

on

If

issue

interpretation and the impact it has on issue response.
Dutton, et. al. set the stage for much of the work to follow by
presenting a model of strategic issue diagnosis (SID), the process whereby
data and stimuli are translated into issues and these issues are interpreted
(1983: 307-8). This is an extension of Ansoff's (1980) impact and urgency
assessment step.
After demonstrating that diagnosis has been considered an important
step in strategic management, not to mention SIM, Dutton, et. al. presented a
three-stage model. The inputs of SID are cognitive maps, political interests,
and issue characteristics, and these are weighed in a process varying
according to its recursiveness, retroductivity, and heterarchy. Based on the
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interplay between these two sets of factors, outputs of assumptions, causeeffect relationships, predictive judgments, and labels emerge. Although the
outputs are viewed as affecting the inputs, SID can be linked with SIM at this
point by realizing that the outputs of diagnosis influence the kind of
response the organization makes, and thus "outputs" is placed under the
response column in Table 1. The emphasis in this model is on the complexity
of the environment and the difficulty that managers have in making sense
of it. Strategic issue diagnosis was presented as one way this sense-making
occurs.
Variation and further development of strategic issue diagnosis were
presented in Dutton and Duncan (1987).

Again, a three-stage model was

posited, consisting of an activation stage, followed by issue assessment,
leading to a diagnosis outcome.

A strategic issue diagnosis episode is

triggered either through gap analysis or stakeholder demands. This leads to
two assessments being made in the second stage. The urgency assessment
concerns how important it is for the organization to act on this issue and the
feasibility assessment relates to how likely it is that the organization can
implement an effective issue response. These assessments in turn affect the
momentum for change that will determine the magnitude of the response,
either radical or incremental. This model emphasized even more than Ansoff
(1980) the types of assessments made during issue diagnosis and
interpretation.
This model was in turn, further developed and modified in Dutton, et.
al. (1990). In a model directed toward the response end of the SIM process,
issue perceptions were seen to influence issue assessment, which in turn
influences the investment of managerial and organizational resources to
deal with an issue. Perceptions of the issue's expected duration, the locus of
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responsibility for the issue, and the issue's visibility affect the urgency
assessment. Perceptions of the level of understanding the organization has
of an issue and the capability of the organization to respond were argued to
affect the feasibility assessment. These assessments influence the allocation
of money, time, and the priority an issue receives.
Some more recent models have included contextual influences on SIM.
For example, Thomas and McDaniel (1990) presented a cross-level model of
strategic issue interpretation.

Organization-level phenomena independent

of the strategic issue impact an individual's (in this case the CEO's) issue
interpretation that influences strategic action at the organization level. The
organizational context and the cognitive processes of the CEO will influence
the kinds of interpretations the CEO makes. Similarly, Milliken (1990) posited
that different organizational characteristics will affect the interpretation
process.
Following in this new trend of including contextual influences,
Schneider and de Meyer (1991) presented an elaborate model of the
determinants of strategic issue interpretation and response.

Here context

influences interpretation and interpretation then influences response.
Individual, group, organizational, and environmental factors affect issue
interpretation.

In turn, issue interpretation influences issue response,

which may also be directly affected by the contextual factors.
The trend in SIM models has been away from mere chronological
relationships (i.e., first step one occurs followed by step two, and so on) and
toward more causal ones, which are more amenable to empirical testing. Two
areas of considerable interest emerge from this review of the SIM literature.
The context surrounding the SIM process is presented as being important,
and many relationships

between

different

contextual

factors

and
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interpretation are possible. Some hypotheses related to context have been
tested, for example Milliken (1990) and Thomas and McDaniel (1990). These
researchers did find significant relationships between some aspects of
context and interpretation.
The second area of interest is the relationship between interpretation
and response. Asked another way: What kinds of interpretations lead to what
kinds of responses?

Dutton and Jackson (1987) posited ten hypotheses

concerning the links between issue interpretation and organizational action.
For example, if an issue is seen as a threat, the organization is likely to enact
a revolutionary,

internal-directed response.

Issues perceived

as

opportunities, however, would lead to incremental, external-directed
responses. Dutton, et. al. (1990) indirectly tested some of these ideas, finding
that issue interpretation affected the commitment of time to an issue and the
issue's priority. Their study did not use actual issues or organizations, but two
behavioral simulations of organizations. Dutton and Dukerich (1991) used a
longitudinal, case-study methodology to study an organization's responses to
a strategic issue. They found that the issue's affect on the organization's
image and identity were crucial factors in determining the organization's
response.
No study has specifically examined the impact of issue interpretation
on response to an actual strategic issue in a field setting using more than one
organization. For example, Dutton and Webster (1988) examined the impact of
interpretation on response but used an artificial, organizational in-basket,
setting. Milliken (1990) examined interpretation of an actual strategic issue
using a sample of many organizations but did not investigate any links with
response.

Dutton and Dukerich (1991) examined how interpretation of an

actual strategic issue affected responses to it, but only at a single
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organization. Thomas, Clark, and Gioia (1993) examined interpretation and
response in a multi-organization sample but used interpretations of artificial
case studies rather than an actual strategic issue.

Consequently, the

subsequent actions these organizations took were not necessarily in response
to the issues identified in the case studies. The effects found in this study
were more closely related to how interpretational tendencies influenced
subsequent strategic actions and not how interpretations of an actual
strategic issue influenced response to that issue.
Research conducted in artificial settings or consisting of single-case
studies may lack external validity, and hence, not be applicable beyond the
artificial environment or the single organization that was the subject of
study (Cook & Campbell, 1979; Eisenhardt, 1989, 1990). This dissertation fills a
gap in the literature by testing relationships between interpretation and
response to an actual strategic issue using data from executives in a single
industry. As such, it tests a portion of some of the models outlined above
which include an interpretation-response link. It will also yield information
on the nature of the relationships between issue interpretation an d
response.

This research is prescriptive in nature, rather than normative,

given that performance outcomes are not measured.

Next, a review of the

literature on interpretation and organizational responses is made. Then the
model of SIM that will be used in this dissertation is presented.

A brief

summary then concludes Chapter 2.
Issue Interpretation
Three views of the environment -- (1) objective, (2) subjective, and (3)
enacted -- are based on different assumptions about the environm ent
(Smircich & Stubbart, 1985). The objective environment and the perceived
environment viewpoints are simply variations on the same theme. In them,
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the environment is real, imposing constraints and demands to which the
organization must adapt. The objective view assumes that decision makers
can know all they need to know to design appropriate strategies, while the
perceived view assumes boundedly-rational organizational actors (Lord &
Maher, 1990).

The third view pictures organizations and environments

being created together through social interaction processes (Weick, 1979)
and asserts that separate, objective environments, as such, do not exist.
While drawing on literature based on the enacted environment view, this
research is firmly grounded in the perceived environment perspective.
Organizations act on their perceptions of the environment since this
represents essential reality to them.

The order that does exist in an

organization's environment may be quite subtle, and organizational attempts
to model such order are inhibited by the limited and intended rationality of
decision makers involved in these efforts (March & Simon, 1958; Cyert &
March, 1963). The organization must attempt to impose some order on the
seemingly unordered experiences it faces in the environment (Weick & Daft,
1983).
Organizations tend to package these experiences into strategic "issues"
to organize attention and interpretation (Dutton, et. al., 1983). Though the
identification of strategic issues has been viewed as a sense-making or orderimposing mechanism, implying that each organization's conceptualization of
an issue will be unique, the set of stimuli that generate a strategic issue
diagnosis episode (Dutton & Duncan, 1987) would be common to all
organizations facing it. Thus, the actual confluence of events can be thought
of as a "real" strategic issue that exists independent of any observer's
attempts to identify or define it, as implied in Ansoff (1975, 1980).

The

existence of environments and issues independent of observers fits with the
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perceived environment view (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985; Downey & Slocum,
1975; 1982).
Daft and Weick (1984) discussed the importance of interpretation in
understanding macro-organizational behavior. They pictured interpretation
as a mediational stage between data collection and action taking where the
data are analyzed, or given meaning. Ford and Baucus (1987) also recognized
the importance of interpretation. They modeled interpretation as affecting
the kinds of responses that an organization would make to a performance
downturn, an event that could easily be considered a strategic issue (Ansoff,
1980), though in this case an idiosyncratic one. They went further to argue
that it is impossible to design an organization that is free of interpretation
(Ford & Baucus, 1987: 376) since it is central to organizational activity.
The importance of interpretational activity has also been stressed in
Nottenburg and Fedor (1983), where it is seen as mediating between scarcity
in the environment and organizational responses to it.

Interpretations are

not rigid and unchanging, but pliable and evolving, and usually do not stop
changing until well after an event has unfolded (Isabella, 1990).

Both

Thomas and McDaniel (1990) and Schneider and de Meyer (1991) examine
interpretations made of strategic issues and argue that these interpretations
influence the response an organization makes. This survey of the literature
indicates a consensus concerning the necessity of a mediational step between
data collection and organizational response.
By reviewing the literature on interpretation, the importance of a
mediating, data-analysis type step in the SIM process has been established.
Next, the literature on organizational responses to different events and the
factors that influence them will be reviewed.
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Organizational Responses
The literature on organizational responses to emerging developments
can be divided into three streams: responses to strategic issues; responses to
social issues; and responses to competitor activities. Each will be reviewed in
turn.
Responses to strategic issues. Dutton and Jackson (1987) hypothesized
that interpretation would affect organizational responses. They posited that
categorizing an issue as a threat would lead to internal-directed responses
and responses of large magnitude. Opportunities, on the other hand, lead to
external-directed responses and responses of small magnitude.

These

hypotheses have not been tested as stated, although some studies (Dutton &
Duncan, 1987; Dutton & Webster, 1988; Dutton, et. al., 1990; Schneider & de
Meyer, 1991; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991) do have some bearing on them.
Assessments as to an issue's feasibility of resolution and urgency are
also seen as affecting organizational responses (Dutton & Duncan 1987). The
greater the urgency of an issue and the greater the feasibility to resolve an
issue the greater the momentum for change, which leads to responses that
are relatively large in magnitude. These propositions have not been directly
tested either.
As for empirical research, five studies have bearing on organizational
responses to strategic issues.

Dutton and Webster (1988) found that

managerial interest in issues was correlated positively with the feasibility of
resolving them.
(1987).

This can be viewed as supportive of Dutton and Duncan

Dutton, et. al. (1990) found that an issue's urgency and

interdependence with other issues predicted manager's allocation of time to
that issue and how much of a priority an issue was considered to be. This
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result is also broadly supportive of Dutton and Duncan's (1987) framework.
The methodology employed was an organizational in-basket simulation.
Although Schneider and de Meyer (1991) did not explicitly consider
the relationship between interpretation and response, their results
indirectly suggest that such a relationship may exist, though the two
variables would be spuriously related to national culture.

This is because

they focused on the effect of culture on both interpretation and response,
rather than the link between them.

Latin Europeans were more likely to

interpret an issue as a crisis or threat and were also more likely to
recommend more proactive responses.

The methodology employed was

respondent analysis of a case study.
Along somewhat different lines, Dutton and Dukerich (1991) found
that organizational identity and image influenced an organization's
responses to the issue of homelessness. Image and identity were found to
influence issue interpretations and motivations for responding to the issue.
The effect was not concurrent, but issue interpretation and motivation to
respond evolved over time within limits set by identity and image.
Interpretation and motivation also influenced the responses taken.

The

methodology employed was an in-depth case study of a single organization.
Thomas, et. al. (1993) came closest to testing the impact of
interpretation on response in a large-sample field setting. Using case studies
to simulate realistic strategic issues, they hypothesized that interpretational
labels of positive-gain and controllable would be positively related to
subsequent product and service changes in hospitals. Only the hypothesis
for controllability was supported. Although very methodologically sound,
their use of case studies in lieu of an actual strategic issue makes
interpreting their findings somewhat problematic. Subsequent changes may

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

26
not have been in response to the issues the case studies highlighted. There
was no way of knowing whether or not a product or service change was in
response to the issues interpreted in the case studies or in response to
something else.

Their findings

actually

relate

more

closely

to

interpretational tendencies (revealed in the analysis of artificial case
studies) influencing subsequent organizational activity, and not a direct
interpretation-response link.
While relationships between issue interpretation and response have
been suggested, as has been demonstrated, a direct test has not yet been made.
This represents an area where further empirical research is needed.
Responses to social issues. The literature on responses to social issues
is related to public affairs (Arrington & Sawaya, 1984), public relations
(Cheney & Vibbert, 1987), and social responsibility (Wartick & Cochran,
1985).

There are articles within these traditions that relate to issue

management and response and these will be the focus of this review.
Though concerns with what could be termed "social responsiveness"
go back for decades (see Cheney & Vibbert, 1987; Heath & Nelson, 1986) it was
during the mid- to late-1970s that this concern began to coalesce around
managing issues. This was due to the myriad of social issues that businesses
had to face for the first time that arose in the late 1960s to early 1970s
(Wartick & Cochran, 1985). Much of the literature addresses responses to
social and public issues in a pragmatic or case-study manner (for examples
see Marx, 1986; Littlejohn, 1986; Wartick & Rude, 1986).

Several articles,

however, did address organizational responses to social and public issues and
these will be examined more closely.
A conceptual framework for evaluating response patterns o f
businesses was developed in Sethi (1979).

These patterns can be
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characterized as social obligation (do what is required by law), social
responsibility (mitigate the negative impacts of an issue), and social
responsiveness (promote positive change). Using the infant formula foods
controversy as the issue of interest, Sethi traces how different companies
progressed along the three patterns as the issue developed. Initially, all five
companies exhibited a social obligation response pattern.

As time passed,

however, the companies diverged in the types of patterns they exhibited. By
the end of the analysis period, one company was still in a social obligation
pattern, three were classified as social responsibility, and one had progressed
to social responsiveness.

The reason the response patterns for different

companies diverged over time was not explored systematically, and the
question was left unaddressed.
Social demands arising in society were recognized as po ten tial
strategic issues in Arcelus and Schaefer (1982). After breaking down the life
cycle of social demands into various stages, the authors suggest that it is
advantageous for organizations to respond as early in the life cycle as
possible because social demands can have a strategic-level impact.

Their

discussion of why early responses would be preferred represents one
explanation why different firms respond differently.

Early response ought

to make the development of an efficient response more likely, enable an
organization to gain a competitive edge, allow the organization to participate
in the political-social decision-making process, and to avoid the unfavorable
pressure that various groups can bring to bear on a slow-to-respond
organization (Arcelus & Schaefer, 1982: 351-352). It is likely that perceptions
of these advantages may differ across firms.

These perceptual differences

would explain the different response patterns noted by Sethi (1979).
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addressed were the factors that might lead to these perceptual differences,
however.
Social issues management was identified as an important component of
corporate social performance in Wartick and Cochran (1985).

They

recognized the different areas of issue management: strategic, public, and
social issues (Wartick & Cochran, 1985: 766) and that they were essentially
the same thing, but did not integrate the different literatures into a single
framework. Issues management is pictured as a way to implement corporate
social performance policies and represents the third leg of their social
performance model.
Another comparative study of the responses of different companies to
a social issue was made in Paul and Duffy (1988), where the actions of four
large investors in South Africa taken in response to pressures to disinvest
are traced. While the different patterns of response of each company were
noted, no systematic attempt was made to account for these differences.
The greatest conceptual advance concerning issue response in this
area was made by Oliver (1991).

Although not investigating responses to

issues (her work was grounded in institutional theory), her research led to a
list of institutional antecedents to strategic responses. The thorough list she
generated included the cause of the institutional pressure (social or
economic), the identity of the constituents exercising the pressure, the
nature of the constraints being imposed, the means through which the
pressure is being exerted, and the environmental context within which the
pressures are being exerted (Oliver, 1991: 160). Organizations are theorized to
respond along a continuum of strategies ranging from outright acquiescence
to the pressures to attempts to manipulate the institutional processes
involved (Oliver, 1991: 152).

This framework represents a rigorous
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explanation of what leads to differential response patterns on the parts of
different businesses, something lacking until then.
Goodstein (1994) tested Oliver's model using employer involvement in
work-family issues and found that organizational size, the percentage of
female employees, and the diffusion of norms of dealing with such issues in
the same industry and country were all positively related to responsiveness.
These findings were taken as supportive of Oliver's institutional model.
Wood (1991a, 1991b) identified issues management as an important
component of corporate social performance. Issues management was argued
to be a process of social responsiveness, placing the emphasis, as it most
often has been in the area of social issues management, on the act of
responding (Wood, 1991b). Most of the research done in this area, however,
has not focused on the response stage, but on those activities leading to it
(Wood, 1991a).
A review of the conceptual and empirical literature in the area of
social and public issues response reveals something of a gap. While progress
has been made in addressing this topic, little

rigorous conceptual

development has occurred that would advance our understanding about what
types of antecedents lead to what kinds of responses but for Oliver (1991).
The ideas that have been forwarded have not been thoroughly tested. This
dissertation will make its contribution to this stream of literature on this
point.
Responses to competitor's moves. Most of the empirical work on
organizational responses has occurred not in the issues management area,
but in the literature on responses to competitive moves. What follows is a
review of this literature indicating its relevance to responses to strategic
issues.
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MacMillan, McCaffery, and Wijk (1985) studied the reaction of banks to
commercial banking product introductions.

They examined the impact of

several different factors on lagtime, or the time it took for a bank to respond
to a new product offered by a competitor. It was found that banks responded
more quickly when the product launch was visible to other banks, the extent
to which the product was not radically different from existing products; the
easier it was to offer a similar product, the degree to which the new product
would fit well with existing products, and the extent to which the new
product attacked a strategically important customer group.
Operating within an interpretation framework, Smith and Grimm
(1991) produced a list of hypotheses relating response timing to a host of
contextual factors.

Some of the factors that influence the timing of

competitive responses relate to information contained in the competitive
action, characteristics of the initiating firm, and the competitive action
itself.

The competitive environment, as well as organizational and

demographic characteristics, is also hypothesized to be important.
Some of these ideas were empirically tested in Smith, et. al. (1991).
Corporate responses to strategic actions were characterized into fo u r
attributes: the degree to which the response imitated the initiating action,
the likelihood that a firm would respond, the lag of the response, and how
fast the firm responded relative to its competitors.

They found that

contextual factors such as the orientation of the firm, structure, slack, and
demographic characteristics of management affected competitive response
in some fashion.

They also concluded that the manner in which a firm

interprets and processes information has an impact on response, but the
impact of specific types of interpretations was not assessed.
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Chen, Smith, and Grimm (1992) studied competitive responses to the
actions of rival firms. The following relationships obtained. The importance
of the market under attack is positively related to the number of responses
and, unexpectedly, negatively to the timing of the response.

Also, the

greater the effort required to implement the initial action, the fewer the
number of responses and the longer the time taken to respond.

Initial

actions viewed as strategic, as opposed to tactical, also had the same effect on
responses.

Their findings were taken to mean that the more difficult an

action would be to respond to, the lower in magnitude and the slower in
timing the response would be.
Though not directly addressing issue management, studies from the
literature on competitive responses are quite relevant to studies of responses
to strategic issues. Most of the studies listed above recognize the importance
of interpretation and reference the strategic issue management literature.
This dissertation has the potential to make a contribution to understanding
responses to different kinds of competitive actions, an area of the strategic
management literature that has been relatively unresearched until recently
(Smith & Grimm, 1991).
To summarize, the study of organizational responses to strategic issues
can be informed from various literatures and has the potential to provide
useful information to them, in turn. This indicates the importance of this
dissertation and provides a framework for better understanding the
implications of the results.
Model of Issue Interpretation and Response
A model of issue interpretation and response appears in Figure 1. The
characteristics of the issue and the context in which interpretation occurs
affect interpretation.

Although these links will not be examined in this
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dissertation, they are included for the sake of conceptual completeness. Issue
interpretation, in turn, affects issue response.

Characteristics

Intemretation
Urgency
Understanding
Capability

Interpretation
Context

ResDonse
Magnitude
Immediacy
Locus
Activeness

Figure 1 - Model of Issue Interpretation and Response

The following example demonstrates the different components of this
model. Several years ago the Food and Drug Administration decided to hold
hearings on the idea of requiring more extensive nutritional labeling on
food. Nutrition labeling clearly represented a strategic issue for packaged
food companies. How would they respond?
Referencing Figure 1, both the characteristics of the issue itself and
the context will influence the kinds of interpretations an organization would
make.

Some of the issue characteristics might be: the sector of the

environment in which the issue originated (in this case, the legalgovernmental one); the manner in which the issue becomes known (a public
announcement); and identity of the stakeholder groups that were involved
during the issue's beginning (consumer advocacy groups, the federal
government).

These factors have an impact on how an organization views

an emerging strategic issue. Some contextual factors could be: the kind of
scanning and monitoring system the organization has (formal or informal);
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the organization's perceptions of its task environment (perhaps non
munificent); and the particular strategy the organization is following
(prospector or defender).

These would have filtering effects on the data

about the issue coming into the organization (Boyd, Dess, & Rasheed, 1993).
Each organization would then make an assessment as to the degree of
urgency, understanding, and capability that exists with the issue of labeling
regulations.

An interpretation of high urgency could indicate that the

organization believes that it must take some kind of action soon in response
to this issue. An interpretation of high understanding might mean that the
organization believes it comprehends the regulatory situation in Washington
and knows of several alternatives that it could implement in response. An
interpretation of high capability could mean that the organization believes it
has the resources necessary to respond to this issue.

The types of

interpretations made would affect the kind of response the organization will
make.
Responses vary in magnitude, immediacy, locus, and activeness.

A

response of large magnitude could be a total overhaul of labeling procedures
in a company, for example. An immediate response would be one taken soon
after the announcement of hearings was made. This would be regardless of
what kind of response it is, perhaps nothing but a press release. A response
that has an external locus would be lobbying Congress to delay labeling
regulations, while an internal response would be to study the cost of
different labeling options. An active response would be a company directly
responding to the issue, perhaps by altering its strategy or engaging in
advocacy advertising, while a passive response would be a committee meeting
called to rationalize doing nothing.
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While this is not a definitive example, it should give some idea about
what each of these components means in practice. Next, a brief discussion of
the first two model components is made and then followed by an in-depth
description of the last two.
Issue characteristics and interpretation context. The model has
identified two different sets of forces having convergent and divergent
influences, respectively, on organizational responses.

In other words, the

relationship between issue characteristics and interpretation indicates that
since organizations are interpreting the same sets of stimuli, they will tend
to respond in a convergent manner: their responses will be similar.

The

relationship between interpretation context and interpretation, however,
would lead us to expect organizational responses to be very different from
each other, since organizational contexts would be expected to differ.
Whether issue characteristics or interpretation context will have the
more powerful influence is an empirical question beyond the scope of this
dissertation.

Suffice it to say that the issue interpretation and response

model is organizational-level, rather than issue-level, and it is anticipated
that interpretations, and hence, responses, will measurably differ between
organizations.
The rest of the section discusses in some detail the two components of
Figure 1 to be empirically tested.
Issue interpretation and response assets. Issue interpretation relates
to the array of assets an organization needs to respond to a strategic issue.
The process of strategic issue management involves

scanning,

data

interpretation, and response (Daft & Weick, 1984) and it is with a view toward
formulating and implementing a response that SIM occurs at all (Ansoff,
1975). If the organization did not have to respond to a strategic issue, then
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issue interpretation would be merely an academic endeavor consisting of
exploring possible interpretations of an issue for the sake of knowledge
alone.

Since a strategic issue presses upon an organization, however, and

demands by its potential effect on its operations, systems, and strategy that
the organization react in some way, the interpretation of a strategic issue is
likely to be made with an eye on what type of action is necessary.
The importance of responding to a strategic issue would affect issue
interpretation by relating the issue to the types of assets required to respond
to it. These "response assets" are time, information, and resources.
Time is an important consideration for organizations (Harrigan, 1985;
Bluedom & Denhardt, 1988; Smith & Grimm, 1991) and the importance of time
as a response asset is stressed in Ansoff (1975, 1980).

Understanding a

strategic issue, formulating a response to it, and then gathering the
resources necessary to implement the response can be a time-consuming
process. An organization needs to know how much time it has to do these
things so it can respond quickly or slowly, depending on the circumstances.
Information is another critical response asset.

In order for an

effective response to be made to a strategic issue, an organization needs
information on the state of the issue itself, what effect the issue might have
on the organization, and what response options may be appropriate
(Milliken, 1987, 1990).

Armed with this knowledge the organization can

confidently allocate resources to its issue response, while if it lacks this
knowledge it needs to proceed cautiously since the risk of implementing an
ineffective response is high.
The third response asset is resources, and these may represent
financial resources, physical resources, managerial resources, and goodwill.
These are the factors that will be manipulated in implementing the issue
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response. When high levels of these resources exist, it opens a much broader
range of response options for the organization, while if they are lacking,
then the organization's options will be constrained.
Stock assessments. These response assets are critical to the response
stage of SIM. Organizations, therefore, will assess the stock of these assets.
The urgency assessment estimates the stock of time available, the
understanding assessment estimates the stock of information available, and
the capability assessment estimates the stock of resources available.
The urgency assessment is the perceived cost of doing nothing in
response to an issue (Miller, 1982).

The higher the level of urgency, the

more important it is for the organization to respond quickly because there is
less time to respond (Dutton & Jackson, 1987). The urgency assessment is the
result of assessments and attributions relating to various issue dimensions
(Dutton, et. al., 1990). The urgency assessment is influenced by deadlines,
anticipated issue duration (degree of stability), publicity, and locus of
responsibility, or causality (Dutton & Duncan, 1987: 283-4). If the urgency
assessment is low, then the organization thinks it has enough time to
formulate and implement a response and it does not need to act immediately.
If the urgency assessment is high, then the organization thinks there is an
insufficient amount of time to review options, discuss alternatives, and
compare the possible impact of different responses and the organization
must act quickly, even at the risk of taking a faulty course of action.
The understanding assessment represents the degree of issue certainty
that exists (Milliken, 1990).

This assessment is essentially a composite of

three types of issue certainty: state, effect, and response (Milliken, 1987).
State certainty concerns the issue itself, what it entails, and what course it
might take.

Effect certainty concerns what effect the issue might have on
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the organization.

Response certainty concerns what alternative actions the

organization can take and the effectiveness of each of the alternatives.
Where these three types of certainty are high, the understanding assessment
will be high, as well, and the organization thinks it has an adequate amount
of information to respond to an issue. When any or all of these three types of
certainty are low, however, the understanding assessment will be low.

In

this case it will be believed that the organization does not have a sufficient
amount of information to locate and implement an effective response.
The capability assessment concerns whether sufficient resources exist
for the organization to be able to respond effectively (Dutton & Duncan,
1987). This involves a variety of resources. Physical resources, such as plant
and equipment; financial resources, such as cash or unused debt capacity;
managerial resources, representing the systems of the organization and the
competencies and skills of its managers; market resources, such as
distribution systems in place, and reputation; and human resources and the
skills resident within them all represent resource areas that might be
involved in an organization's response.

These resources also relate to the

idea of distinctive competence and strengths in the different value chain
functions (Selznick, 1957; Porter, 1980).

The stock assessment of these

different resources is made concerning a strategic issue.

That is, the

capability assessment of one issue might be high because the organization
has adequate stocks of the resources needed to respond to that particular
issue, but it may be low for another issue because the organization has low
stocks of resources needed to respond to the second issue.

When the

resources relating to a particular issue are in abundance, the capability
assessment will be high, implying that the organization thinks it will have
great latitude in which response alternative it decides to implement.

When
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there is a low stock of these resources, however, the capability assessment
will be low and this indicates that the organization thinks it will be restricted
in the kinds of responses it can make, perhaps to the degree that the more
effective responses are outside its capability.
These three stock assessments, urgency, understanding, and capability
are all made about specific strategic issues in separately triggered strategic
issue diagnosis episodes (Dutton, et. al., 1983; Dutton & Duncan, 1987). In
other words, each individual strategic issue is assessed as to urgency,
understanding, and capability. These stock assessments are affected by the
actual stock levels pertaining to each, but are also influenced by issue
characteristics and the interpretation context, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Issue response. The type of interpretations made about a strategic
issue will affect the kind of response that the organization will make. While
there are many ways to classify organizational responses (see Milburn,
Schuler, & Watman [1983] for one such scheme; Fink, Beak, & Taddeo [1971]
for a more process-oriented approach), of particular interest to this study are
magnitude, immediacy, locus, and activeness. Response magnitude refers to
the extent and permanence of the response. Response immediacy refers to
how quickly the response is implemented. Response locus refers to the area
that the response targets for change and can vary between internal and
external. Response activeness refers to whether the organization attempts to
deal directly with the strategic issue or fails to address it by using various
avoidance or coping mechanisms. These response dimensions are closely and
logically related to the stock assessments, as will be shown below.
These four response dimensions also figure prominently in the
interpretationist literature on organizational response.

Ford (1985)

dichotomized response strategies as either external or internal (the locus
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measure here).

Ford and Baucus (1987) addressed the dimensions of

activeness and locus in their model of adaptation to performance downturn.
Dutton and Jackson (1987) pictured responses to strategic issues as varying
along target (internal or external) and magnitude. Dutton and Duncan (1987)
presented the idea of strategic momentum, and how greater amounts of
momentum drive larger and quicker responses.

The dimensions of

magnitude and immediacy are also of interest in the literature on responses
to competitive moves (Smith & Grimm, 1991; Smith, et. al., 1991; Chen, et. al.,
1992).
Response magnitude captures the extent to which organizational
changes might be classified as revolutionary (Pettigrew, 1987; Miller &
Friesen, 1982, 1983; Meyer, Brooks, & Goes, 1990). Responses that could be
considered of large magnitude are those involving changes in many
organizational components, changes in the interpretation system itself, or
changes that are of a permanent, rather than a temporary, nature (Dutton, &
Jackson, 1987). Large-magnitude responses are likely to be more costly in
resources than small-magnitude responses.
Responses can also vary along the dimension of immediacy, or the
amount of time elapsed between issue interpretation and the initiation of a
response (Ansoff 1975, 1980; Smith & Grimm, 1991; Chen, et. al., 1992).
Immediacy is lower the greater the amount of elapsed time.
Responses can also be measured along the dimension of locus, whether
the response is internal or external (Miles, 1980; Milburn, et. al., 1983).
Internal responses focus on altering administrative arrangements to adjust
to the issue, such as altering

organization

design,

changing

the

interpretation system, and instituting new programs. (Ford, 1985; Ford &
Baucus, 1987). External responses, on the other hand, can take the form of
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domain offense, domain defense, domain creation, or domain abandonment
(Ford, 1985; Miles, 1982; Zammuto & Cameron, 1985).
The fourth dimension along which organizational responses to
emerging strategic issues can be measured is activeness.

Active responses

are those undertaken to deal directly with the emerging issue (Ford & Baucus,
1987) and they consist of the internal and external responses listed above.
Passive responses, on the other hand, do not attempt to deal with the issue
and may include anger, denial, alterations of the importance of the issue, and
resignation (Ford & Baucus, 1987). Fink, et. al. (1971) characterize the first
two phases of organizational crisis as shock and defensive retreat, and the
actions (or inactions) of organizational decision makers during these stages,
such as avoidance, wishful thinking, helplessness, resistance to change, or
indifference are characteristic of passive responses.
Summary
Chapter Two started with a review of various types of issue
management models appearing in the literature. These models tend to follow
a three-step sequence of identification, analysis, and response. More recent
models have tended to focus more on the link between analysis and response,
however, as well as emphasizing the importance of context. The focus of the
review then shifted to issue interpretation itself. While the language of the
interpretational approach to understanding organizational environments
will often be used, this research is firmly grounded in the perceived
environments perspective. In their attempts to understand complex external
environments, organizational actors respond to various issues emanating
prim arily

from the external environment.

Three perspectives o n

responding to such issues were reviewed; responding to strategic issues,
social issues, and competitor's moves.
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The chapter ended with an in-depth discussion of a model of issue
interpretation and response that is used as the framework for this
dissertation.

Issue interpretation is influenced by the interpretational

context and the characteristics of the issue itself. Interpretations are made
concerning the urgency of the issue, the degree of understanding the
organization

has concerning the issue, and the capability that the

organization has to effectively respond to the issue. These interpretations
are related to three critical response assets, time, information, and resources,
that are necessary for an organization to formulate and implement an issue
response. Interpretation effects issue response and these responses can vary
along magnitude, immediacy, locus, and activeness.
The interpretation-response model forms the framework from which
the hypotheses for this dissertation are drawn, concentrating, as has been
the case in much of the recent literature, on the link between interpretation
and response.
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Chapter 3 - Hypotheses
This chapter begins with a brief review of the assessments made
during the interpretation stage, then each of the response dimensions is
discussed in turn, where the stock assessments are related to each response
dimension.
Relationship Between Issue Interpretation and Response
It was demonstrated that three assessments are made during the issue
interpretation stage of the SIM process. These relate to the stock of various
response assets, assets that will be needed to formulate and implement a
response to a strategic issue. The urgency assessment relates to the asset of
time, the understanding assessment relates to the asset of information, and
the capability assessment relates to the asset of resources. These assessments
mean more than simply measurement of a response asset and have
implications for the kinds of responses that are needed and feasible.

The

specific relationships between interpretational assessments and response
dimensions are included in Figure 2.
For example, a lack of time indicates an urgent situation, implying that
a response needs to be made sooner than later.
indicates a low level of understanding.

A lack of information

This means the organization will

have a low degree of certainty as to which response is best. Further, a lack of
resources indicates low organizational capability, meaning that the
organization will face constraints in the kinds of responses that are feasible.
These assessments have implications for the organization's response, and
how the response dimensions are influenced by them is discussed next.
Response magnitude. The assessment of issue capability influences
response magnitude.

If decision makers within an organization do not

perceive that adequate resources are on hand, then the array of

42

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

43

H2B

H2A

Immediacy

Urgency
H2C

H1B

H1A
Capability

Magnitude

H3B
H3A
Locus
H4C

Understanding

H4B
Activeness

H4A

All Hypothesized relationships are positive.
Figure 2 - Relationships between the Stock Assessments and Issue Response

possible response options will be constrained (Dutton & Duncan, 1987) and
the magnitude of the response the organization does manage to enact will be
correspondingly small.

On the other hand, if capability is high, the

organization thinks resources do exist for a response of large magnitude and
they are more likely to be expended.

Chen, et. al. (1992) found that the

degree of difficulty (lack of capability) of responding to an issue was
negatively related to the magnitude of reaction, measured by the number of
responses, a finding broadly supportive of the argument made here.

This

positive relationship is pictured in Figure 2.
Response magnitude is also influenced by the understanding
assessment.

When the stock of information is low, an organization is not

likely to perceive that a large-scale change is feasible due to the uncertainty
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involved (Ansoff, 1980; Dutton & Duncan, 1987). In this case the response the
organization implements will be of smaller magnitude, suggesting a positive
relationship between the understanding assessment and response magnitude.
This is pictured in Figure 2.
Thus,
H I a - C apability has a significant, p o sitive a ffe ct on
Response Magnitude.

Stock assessments o f high c a p a b ility

lead to large magnitude responses, and stock assessments o f
low capability lead to small magnitude responses.
H lb - Understanding has a significant, positive affect on
Response

M agnitude.

Stock

assessments

of high

understanding lead to large magnitude responses, and stock
assessments o f low understanding lead to small magnitude
responses.
Response im m ediacy. When the assessment of urgency is low, an
organization believes that it is not necessary to formulate a response quickly
and the response, in whatever form it takes, is likely to be delayed (Dutton &
Duncan, 1987; Webb & Weick, 1979). When the urgency assessment is high,
however, the response will be more immediate (Ansoff, 1980). Time pressure
and the existence of deadlines strongly influence the urgency assessment,
and research has shown the presence of deadlines to motivate those under
them to higher levels of exertion the closer the deadline nears (Webb &
Weick, 1979). Hence, more urgent issues lead to more immediate responses.
Also, MacMillan, et. al. (1985) found that banks responded more quickly to
visible competitor product introductions than to less visible ones.

Issue

visibility influences the urgency assessment (Dutton & Duncan, 1987), and
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this finding is supportive of the positive relationship suggested here. This is
pictured in Figure 2.
The understanding assessment also has a positive influence on
response immediacy.

When an organization has a high level of

understanding related to an issue, it will require less time to obtain the
information necessary to respond appropriately since it thinks it already has
most of what it needs. MacMillan, et. al. (1985.) found that banks responded
more quickly to competitor product introductions that were similar to their
present products since, in that case, their level of understanding about the
competitor's product was high.

This positive relationship is pictured in

Figure 2.
Response immediacy is also influenced by the capability assessment
for much the same reason.

When an organization believes it has the

capability to respond to an issue then it is possible for it to enact a response
sooner, other things being equal, than when it believes it does not have the
capability. When capability is high, this implies that the organization does
not need to spend any additional time acquiring more resources since it
already believes it has them. Some empirical research tends to support this
assertion. MacMillan, et. al. (1985) found that the ease of duplication of a
competitor's new product introduction is positively correlated with the
immediacy of response.

Chen, et. al., (1992) found that the difficulty of

responding was negatively correlated with the immediacy of that response.
While alternative interpretations for these results are possible, it is
reasonable to think that organizations would tend to have a high estimate of
issue capability in situations where ease of duplication was high, and a low
estimate of capability where a response would be difficult.

The positive
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relationship between issue capability and immediacy is also pictured in
Figure 2.
Thus,
H2a - Urgency has a significant, positive effect on Response
Immediacy.

Stock assessments o f high urgency lead to

quicker, more immediate responses, and stock assessments o f
low urgency lead to slower, less immediate responses.
H2b - Understanding has a significant, positive effect on
Response

Im m ediacy.

Stock

assessments

o f h ig h

understanding lead to quicker, more immediate responses,
and stock assessments o f low understanding lead to slower,
less immediate responses.
H2c - C apability has a significant, p o sitive effect on
Response Immediacy.

Stock assessments o f high capability

lead to quicker, m ore im m ediate responses, and stock
assessments o f low capability lead to slower, less immediate
responses.
Response locus. The understanding assessment influences response
locus. When understanding is low organizations are more likely to gravitate
toward responses in areas where they have greater control (Jauch & Kraft,
1986). It can be expected that the degree of control an organization has over
its internal operations far exceeds the control it has over its external
environment.

Although organizations may, through various means, gain

some control of their external environment (Pfeffer & Salancik,
control can be exercised internally by management directive.

1978),

Indeed, this

directive role for management is at the heart of the very idea of
"organization" (Coase, 1937). It follows, then, that when the assessment of
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understanding is low, organizations will be attracted toward in tern al
responses. When there is a high perceived level of understanding, however,
organizations are less likely to feel constrained by a lack of control and will
implement external responses with greater frequency.

Figure 2 illustrates

this positive relationship.
The issue capability assessment is likely to have an impact on response
locus. This is based on the assumption, mentioned above, that internal
responses are subject to a greater level of control than external responses.
Because of the inherent lack of control over external

responses,

organizations may face unexpected contingencies in their implementation,
contingencies that require the expenditure of additional resources to assure
the successful resolution of the strategic issue.

Internal responses, being

more under the control of the organization, will not be as susceptible to
unexpected complications in their implementation and would thus not
require the expenditure of additional resources.

Low levels of capability

indicate that the organization thinks resources for a response are lacking,
and so organizations will prefer to implement responses where there is a
higher degree of control.

Thus, internal responses are more likely to be

selected when the issue capability assessment is low.

Where the issue

capability assessment is high, however, the organization does not feel
constrained by a low level of resources and so is more likely to consider
implementing external responses.

Figure 2 captures

this

positive

relationship.
Thus,
H3a - Understanding has a significant, positive effect on
Response Locus. Stock assessments o f high understanding
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lead to external responses, and stock assessments o f lo w
understanding lead to internal responses.
H3b - C apability has a significant, p o sitive

e ffe ct on

Response Locus. Stock assessments o f high capability lead to
external responses, and stock assessments o f low capability
lead to internal responses.
Response activeness. What kinds of interpretations lead to passive
responses?

Passive responses can be expected when the level of stress is

either very low or very high (Ford & Baucus, 1987). Where stress is very low,
as in a case of a very slight threat or a slight to moderate opportunity,
organizations are likely to dismiss the issue as being not important or to deny
that it has any relevance. This type of response can appear very functional
when the organization believes that the issue may be temporary (Weitzel &
Jonsson, 1989).
In response to very threatening issues, where the assessment of
urgency is high and assessments of capability and understanding are low,
although active responses are definitely required, organizations are again
likely to respond passively, relying more on coping behaviors than problem
solving responses (Anderson, 1976).

This passive response is somewhat

similar to a deer staring at the headlights of an onrushing automobile and
has been called the threat-rigidity effect (Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981).
In such situations, organizations tend to restrict the flow of information and
continue in the previous course of action. Often, organizations will escalate
their level of commitment when such challenges to the present course of
action exist by justifying past actions (Dutton & Duncan, 1987), making an
active response even less likely than before, since organizations will expend
effort justifying the lack of change (Staw, 1981; Whyte, 1986).
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In terms of the stock assessments, when understanding is low, for
example, higher levels of capability would not have as great of an impact on
response activeness as when understanding is higher.

In an uncertain

situation the amount of resources would matter less to an organization than
when understanding is high.

Capability would have the same impact on

understanding. High levels of urgency, however, would reduce the impact of
both the understanding and capability stock assessments. These interaction
effects would all be consistent with the threat-rigidity hypothesis.

Since

urgency has an opposite influence in interaction than that of understanding
or capability, it will be reverse-scored for these interaction tests.
Alternatively, active responses are likely when a high level of issue
urgency or issue knowledge exists or when an organization perceives that
there are sufficient resources to respond. Dutton and Webster (1988) found
that when an issue was perceived as feasible (high in both capability and
understanding) managers tended to direct more attention to it. When issue
understanding or issue capability is high, then, a more active response
stance will obtain.

Also, issues assessed as low in urgency are more

appropriately dealt with through passive responses, allowing organizations
to focus attention on more pressing concerns (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989). The
individual, positive effects of the urgency, understanding and capability
assessments are illustrated in Figure 2.
Thus,
H4a - Urgency has a significant, positive effect on Response
Activeness.

Stock assessments o f high urgency lead to

active, d ire ct responses, and stock assessments o f low
urgency lead to passive, indirect responses.
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H4b - Understanding has a significant, positive effect on
Response

Activeness.

Stock

assessments

of

h ig h

understanding lead to active, direct responses, and stock
assessments o f low understanding lead to passive, ind ire ct
responses.
H4c - C apability has a significant, p o s itiv e e ffe ct on
Response Activeness.

Stock assessments o f high capability

lead to active, direct responses, and stock assessments o f low
capability lead to passive, indirect responses.
H4d - The interaction o f Understanding and Capability has a
significant, positive effect on Response Activeness.

Stock

assessments o f high understanding strengthen the effect o f
capability on response activeness, and stock assessments o f
low understanding weaken the effect o f c a p a b ility on
response activeness.

Capability affects the relationship

between understanding and response activeness in the same
m anner.
H4e - The interaction o f reverse-scored

Urgency and

Understanding has a significant, positive effect on Response
Activeness.

Stock assessments of high urgency weaken the

effect o f understanding on response activeness, and stock
assessments o f low urgency strengthen
understanding on response activeness.

the effect o f
Understanding

affects the relationship between urgency and response
activeness in the same manner.
H 4 f - The in te ra ctio n

o f reverse-scored

Urgency and

C apability has a significant, positive effect on Response
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Activeness.

Stock assessments o f high urgency weaken the

effect o f ca p ab ility on response activeness, and stock
assessments

o f low urgency strengthen the effect o f

capability on response activeness.

Capability affects the

relationship between urgency and response activeness in
the same manner.
Summary
Chapter 3 contained the hypotheses tested in this dissertation. The
effects that the three stock assessments have on the four

response

dimensions were delineated. Generally, when Urgency, Understanding, and
Capability are high then Magnitude, Immediacy, Locus, and Activeness are
hypothesized to be high, as well.

This is reasonable because the three

interpretation variables represent assessments of the amount of response
assets the organization has. The higher these are, the more likely it is that
organizations will believe that larger, faster, more external, and more direct
responses are both possible and necessary.
Chapter 4 presents the research methodology used to test these
hypotheses.
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Chapter 4 - Design and Procedure
This chapter begins with an explanation of the industry, issue, and
sample. The measures used in this dissertation are then discussed, as is the
use of retrospective accounts, their pitfalls, and the means used to minimize
these drawbacks. Next, the data collection procedures are discussed and the
chapter concludes with a brief description of the analytic procedures used.
Industry. Issue, and Sample
Milliken (1990) concluded that studying the interpretation of specific
environmental changes was a useful way to learn about the factors that
influence the issue interpretation process.

She examined how college and

university administrators interpreted the decrease in the number of 18-to-22
year olds, an age group from which these institutions draw most of their
students. The best way to test the hypotheses posited here would be to follow
a similar approach. Thus, a specific change for one industry will be used to
test the hypotheses.

Also, by examining one issue in one industry, the

influence of these two areas on the independent and dependent variables
will be held constant.
The industry. The population selected for study here is the restaurant
industry (SIC 5812). Although some definitional ambiguity exists concerning
the types of establishments that populate this industry, "'(F)ast food'
generally means food served to a patron at a self-service counter or through
a drive-in window. . . [either] prepared in advance . . . or cooked to order . . ."
(Emerson, 1990: 17). The view taken here is somewhat broader, including
franchise restaurants that feature sit-down eating and service. Consisting of
160,000 individual restaurants that serve about 46 million Americans every
day who buy an average of $250 worth of food a year (Jacobsen & Fritschner,
1991), the fast-food industry has a major impact on American food

52

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

consumption. Forty percent of the average American family's food budget
goes toward eating out and most of this money is spent on fast food, which
has increasingly come under attack for its poor nutritional value (Clark,
1991; Breo, 1990). The economic impact of the industry is significant, with
sales of $74 billion a year (Clark, 1991).

McDonald's alone, the largest

company in the industry, had 1990 sales of almost $19 billion in its nearly
12,000 outlets worldwide. It has been estimated that 1 out of 15 Americans
initially entered the work force through employment at McDonald's (Love,
1986) and this one fast-food company has a larger job-training program than
the U.S. Army through which a broad range of work skills are taught (Clark,
1991; Wildavsky, 1989).

The restaurant industry includes numerous

segments, such as hamburgers, chicken, pizza, Mexican, seafood, and budget
steak houses (Emerson, 1990).
The impact of this industry on American culture has also been
profound as it has come to represent to many the acme of American throw
away society (Monninger, 1988). This high-visibility industry has, in turn,
been affected by changing social attitudes in a variety of ways and has been
the focus of various criticisms in recent years.

Companies within this

industry have been influenced by societal concerns about nutrition, the
environment, and meaningful work, not to mention other strategic issues
concerning demographic shifts and increasing levels of industry price
rivalry (Clark, 1991).

The presence of numerous such strategic issues in

restaurants in recent years makes this industry a fertile area for the study of
organizational interpretation of such issues.
The issue. The issue of the increased level of interest in nutrition is
best suited to this research. This is for several reasons: its potential impact in
relation to the other issues; a readily identifiable history; and a time frame
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recent enough for respondents to be able to recall critical information, yet
long enough ago for organizations to have had time to interpret and respond
to it. After a brief history of the issue of increased nutrition awareness,
these reasons will be discussed in greater depth.
The issue's development began in the late 1960s when a White House
conference on nutrition and health drew attention
malnutrition (Clark, 1991).

to widespread

Such concerns lay dormant for some time.

Americans became more health conscious in the early 1980s, however,
demonstrating this concern through both increased physical fitness and
better eating habits.

Americans became increasingly aware of the

deleterious effects of dietary fat and were concerned about reducing their
intake of it (Piscatella, 1991).

Since fast-food is quite high in fat, a few

companies during this time introduced some healthier items, mainly salads
and salad bars (Clark, 1991), but most made no changes at all. What remained
to bring this latent issue to the forefront was an awareness of the connection
between fat and fast food.
Phil Sokolof made this connection in the minds of the American
public. In the spring of 1990, he ran a series of hard-hitting advertisements
that accused fast-food companies of having too much fat in their fare (Breo,
1990). Sokolof was a successful executive who suffered a heart attack while
still relatively young and who blamed his once high-fat diet for his poor
health.

In a matter of weeks, several large firms changed the way they

prepared french fries, although there were denials that it had anything to do
with the ads (Clark, 1991).

Before 1990 was out, McDonald's began test

marketing a low-fat hamburger, the McLean Deluxe, and since then other
firms have followed with lower-fat selections of their own (Hume, 1990;
Roberts, 1991).
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This issue has affected other areas of concern for the industry, such as
minority relations and governmental regulation. Fast-food companies began
to be criticized for their part in the poor nutrition of those living in the
inner city and the issue has put them on a more defensive stance in the longrunning battle with the Food and Drug Administration to require labeling of
fast food products (Clark, 1991).

The issue has also opened a niche for

establishments offering a lower-fat menu to enter the restaurant industry,
thus increasing competition (Whittemore, 1991).

Fast food menus and

organizations are likely to continue to evolve in the future in response to
nutritional concerns, but the initial responses have been implemented and
the industry seems to be closer to finding an equilibrium related to this issue.
The issue of increased nutritional concerns is particularly relevant to
the fast-food portion of the restaurant industry because its food is high in
such unhealthy food categories as saturated fat, cholesterol, and salt that are
associated with various physical maladies such as high blood pressure, some
forms of cancer, and heart disease (Clark, 1991). This issue, thus, strikes at
the legitimacy of the industry in ways that public concern over excessive
trash or low-paying, dead-end jobs do not. The potential threat to legitimacy
increases the likelihood that companies in the industry will believe
themselves affected by it in some way and makes it the preferred issue to
study.
The issue of nutritional concerns related to health food is preferred
because it also has a readily identifiable history. The issue was latent for
much of the decade of the 1980s but erupted suddenly and noticeably in the
spring of 1990 when Phil Sokolof ran his very pointed and aggressive
advertisements. The issue has not gone away since, but has been sustained
by further inquiry into the nutritional value of fast foods, including doubt
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concerning the value of newer, "healthier" items (Roberts, 1991; "Fast Food,"
1991). Thus it is easy to anchor a data-collection instrument around specific
incidents and time periods that should serve to increase the equivalence of
data between organizations.
The time frame also makes this issue suitable for study. The issue came
to the forefront about three years ago, recent enough that it would be
possible for respondents to recall crucial information, but long enough ago
for the organization to have formulated and implemented a thorough issue
response. This last requirement is quite important, since for the response
dimension of immediacy to have any meaning a certain period of time must
have elapsed. Also, responses of large magnitude and that are active might
require more time to implement and thus would be missed if the strategic
issue studied occurred too recently.
Thus, by focusing on how restaurant firms interpreted and responded
to the strategic issue of increased nutrition awareness it is possible to test the
hypotheses posited previously. A discussion of specific measures used in this
study follows.
Measures
Interpretation variables. The data interpretation stage of the SIM
model contains the stock assessments, involving the level of response assets
needed to formulate and implement a response to a strategic issue. The three
stock assessments are urgency, understanding, and capability. These involve
assessments of the levels of time, information, and resources, respectively.
The stock assessments were measured with Likert-scale items drawn from
various sources. Appendix B contains a list of these scales.
Issue urgency was measured using eight items corresponding to the
salient dimensions of an issue that lead to an assessment of urgency
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mentioned in Dutton and Duncan (1987) and Dutton, et. al. (1990). These items
are listed in Appendix B and concern organizational responsibility,
anticipated issue duration, time pressure, issue importance, and issue
visibility.

These eight items were summed to represent the perceived

urgency of the issue and the reliability assessed.
Issue understanding was measured with a seven-item response
certainty Likert-scale drawn from Milliken (1990) and, based on initial pre
test comments, simplified for use in this study.

These items appear in

Appendix B. The reliability of this scale when used in Milliken's study was
alpha = .75, which she considered acceptable. Response certainty represents
a measure of the stock of the response asset of information an organization
has and is equivalent to the understanding assessment.
Issue capability was measured two ways: globally and by its
components. The global measure was a seven-item Likert-scale that assessed
the overall impression of whether the organization had adequate resources
to respond effectively to the issue of consumer nutrition awareness.

These

items are also listed in Appendix B.
Following Hofer and SchendePs (1978) and Barney's (1991) discussion
of firm resources, the items of the component capability scale measured four
different areas: financial resources, organizational resources, hum an
resources, and technological resources.

These areas are also included in

other lists of organizational resources found in Digman (1986), Thompson
and Strickland (1983) and Porter (1980).

These scales are presented in

Appendix B. Each of the subscales has four items, except the organizational
one, which has five.
Response variables. Four dimensions of organizational response were
discussed: magnitude, locus, activeness, and immediacy.

Data for these
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variables were collected through the following procedure.

First, a list of

alternative responses to the strategic issue of increased nutrition awareness
was generated.

This list, as well as the whole questionnaire, appears in

Appendix C. The appropriateness of the list as well as its breadth of coverage
was assessed by having several experts familiar with the fast-food industry
examine it.
A panel of experts familiar with the fast-food industry then rated each
alternative response as to its magnitude, locus, and activeness along three
separate four-point Likert-scales.

A description of response magnitude,

locus, and activeness was provided to each expert along with the list of
responses.

A Delphi panel approach was used to elicit two rounds of

responses (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963; Helmer, 1966).

The median response

scores for each variable from the second round represent the expertassigned ratings. This list of possible responses was included in the mail-out
questionnaire and respondents were asked to identify the responses their
particular organization implemented and the approximate date of each
response.
The scores for each organization along response magnitude, locus, and
activeness were calculated as follows. Table 2 contains the operationalization
of the dependent variables. Magnitude was operationalized in three different
ways: the number of responses implemented from the list (MAGNUMBR), the
sum of the magnitude ratings for all responses implemented (MAGRATIN),
and the ratio large responses to small responses (LAR/SMA).

Locus was

operationalized in two ways: the ratio of external responses implemented to
internal responses implemented (EXT/INT) and the number of external
responses implemented (EXTNUMBR). Activeness was also operationalized in
two ways: the ratio of active responses implemented to passive responses
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implemented (ACT/PAS) and the number of active responses implemented
(ACTNUMBR).

In cases where more than one respondent replied for an

organization, the scores from different respondents were averaged to obtain
the final variable values.
Table 2 - Operationalization of the Dependent Variables
Magnitude
MAGNUMBR - the number of implemented responses
MAGRATIN - the sum of the magnitude ratings of the implemented
responses
LAR/SMA - the ratio of large implemented responses to small implemented
responses
Immediacy
IMMYEAR - the year of the initial implemented responses minus 1990
Locus
EXT/INT - the ratio of external implemented responses to internal
implemented responses
EXTNUMBR - the number of external implemented responses
Activeness
ACT/PAS - the ratio or active implemented responses to
implemented responses

passive

ACTNUMBR - the number of active implemented responses

These multiple operationalizations were used due to the various ways
of defining each one.

This approach increases confidence in the content

validity of these measures. This multidimensional approach can also indicate
how robust are the results.

Furthermore, since these dimensions have not

often been operationalized in the past, there is very little previous research
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to indicate which specific measure would be the best to use.

How the

multidimensional nature of these constructs was captured is discussed next.
Response variable operationalization. Each of the three magnitude
measures captures a slightly different aspect of this construct.

An

organization might respond to a response in a large way by implementing
more responses to a strategic issue as opposed to fewer.

This view of

magnitude is captured by counting the number of responses (MAGNUMBR).
Alternatively, an organization that implemented a few large responses
instead of numerous small responses could be said to have responded in a
large manner.

Summing the magnitude ratings for all responses

implemented captures this aspect (MAGRATIN).

Finally, if many of the

responses implemented were of significant magnitude, the organization
could be said to have had a large response set. Measuring the ratio of large
responses to small captures this aspect (LAR/SMA).
Response locus also has various dimensions, two of which are
addressed in the measures used here.

The ratio of external responses to

internal ones (EXT/INT) indicates the tendency of an organization to focus its
attention outside itself in dealing with a strategic issue. If an organization
implements only two responses, however, and one is external, but another
organization implements ten responses, three of which are external, EXT/INT
does not adequately capture the fact that the second organization
implemented three times the number of external responses. This aspect of
locus is captured by measuring the absolute number of external responses
(EXTNUMBR).
Similar logic applies to the activeness measures. The ratio of active to
passive responses (ACT/PAS) indicates the tendency of an organization to
implement responses that directly addressed the strategic issue.

It is
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necessary to measure the absolute number of active responses (ACTNUMBR),
as well, to take into account cases where an organization implemented many
responses, only a few of which are active, as opposed to another organization
that only implemented one response, which was active. ACT/PAS would rate
the latter firm as having a more active set of responses while ACTNUMBR
would rate the first firm as more active.
It is necessary to consider the organization's responses as a whole due
to the organizational level of analysis. This means that multiple responses,
while perhaps being discrete events, all form part of the response-set an
organization puts in place vis-a-vis a strategic issue. The measures above
reflect this consideration.
Response immediacy was measured in two ways: (1) the year of the
first response the company took minus 1990 (IMMYEAR), and (2) IMMYEAR
multiplied by twelve plus the month (1 for January, 2 for February, etc.)
(1MMONTH). The first measure is the number of years between 1990 and the
date of the first response, while the second is the number of months between
January 1990 and the month of the first response mentioned.

IMMYEAR is

somewhat coarse-grained while IMMONTH is more fine-grained.

The first

measure was necessary because, while almost all the respondents could recall
the year that a response was taken, not all of them could recall the month. In
the cases of companies with multiple respondents, the earliest date
mentioned by a n y of the respondents is the one used.

These measures

indicate how quickly it took the organization to initially respond.
Use of retrospective accounts. The use of retrospective accounts as
data sources in strategy research has been the subject of investigation
(Golden, 1992; Schwenk, 1985; Huber & Power, 1985). The consensus of this
research is that while there can be limitations with such data, there are
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instances where it must be used and it can be collected in such a way as to
minimize problems with it.
This research relies on such data heavily.

Sources other th a n

retrospective accounts may contain information on some of the variables to
be included in this research, but the interpretational variables are
perceptual in nature and can only be measured by asking organizational
participants as to their recollections. Thus, retrospective accounts must be
used.
There are various biases involved in the use retrospective accounts
such as hindsight bias, attribution errors, cognitive limitations, and social
desirability (Huber & Power, 1985; Schwenk, 1985). Golden (1992) found that
CEOs were not able to reliably recall organizational strategy after a two-year
interval when compared with how they had assessed that strategy two years
earlier. While this result may have been due to the nature of the collection
instrument (single-item measures of strategy have been criticized on
reliability grounds [Zahra & Pearce, 1990]), it does indicate that such data
should be collected with care and used with caution. These authors have,
however, recommended ways to minimize these problems. A brief discussion
follows of seven of those techniques used here.
(1) Including explanations of questionnaire sub-scales that legitimate
responses of either extreme can be one way to motivate respondents to
provide accurate information and can reduce social desirability bias in some
instances (Golden, 1992; Sheatsley, 1983). Such an explanation was included
at the beginning of the independent variable subsection where social
desirability might be a problem.
(2) Organizational respondents are also more likely to provide
information if, to the extent possible, confidentiality and anonymity are
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maintained (Huber & Power, 1985). The cover letter that was mailed with
each questionnaire assured the respondent of the confidentiality of the data.
Appendix D contains a copy of the letter that was used.
(3) Executive-level people are less likely to fill out questionnaires that
require a significant time commitment (Huber & Power, 1985), and
researchers are encouraged to be frank about this. A reliable time estimate
was made during the pre-test (twenty minutes) and included in the cover
letter (in Appendix D).
(4) Executives are more likely to show interest in providing
information if doing so can be viewed in a useful light (Kincaid & Bright,
1957).

Following Huber and Power (1985), the cover letter stressed the

usefulness and importance of this research.
(5) Retrospective accounts of perceptions are particularly prone to
bias when compared to recollections of facts (Golden, 1992). One way to assist
respondents in accessing subjective information correctly is to ask several
factual questions related to the period the questionnaire involves. This can
increase the salience of that period for the respondent (Boeker, 1989).
Several questions involving such information were included at the
beginning of the respondent questionnaire, page one of which appears in
Appendix E.
(6) Since different individuals are likely to recall events differently, it
is advisable to ask multiple respondents familiar with a single situation
(Schwenk, 1985).

Perceptions of organizational phenomena are likely to

differ between individuals for all kinds of reasons (Hambrick & Mason, 1984),
and responses from one person may tend to offset the recollection biases of
another.

Multiple questionnaires were sent to different individuals in each

organization in an attempt to obtain multiple responses.
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(7)

Finally, many respondents do not prefer a structured format like

the respondent questionnaire followed. Huber and Power (1985) recommend
encouraging respondents to comment or elaborate on their answers to the
Likert-format questions.

Instructions telling respondents to feel free to do

this were included in the questionnaire.
These techniques will not eliminate all the problems with data derived
from retrospective accounts, but should serve to attenuate some of them.
Collection Procedures
Pre-test. The organizational informant questionnaire was pre-tested
twice. The initial test was by distribution to MBA students and recent MBA
graduates of a small, deep-south, private college. The institution offers an
MBA in executive leadership, and has attracted students with extensive
experience in business and the public sector. A brief case study about one
fast-food restaurant's response to the issue of nutrition was included with the
questionnaire (n = 20).

Comments were requested concerning

the

understandability of the instructions and of the questionnaire items.
Of the twenty respondents, thirteen provided information on the
amount of their past work experience.

On average, these thirteen

respondents had 14 years of work experience.
managerial experience, as well.

Five of the thirteen had

These five averaged almost 13 years of

experience as a manager. Their backgrounds were wide-ranging, including
engineering, business administration, information systems, accounting,
finance, and government relations.

None of them appeared to have

experience in the restaurant industry, however, and so, after the
questionnaire was altered, a second pre-test using a sample of restaurant
managers and executives was performed.
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The scales for the variables Urgency, Understanding, and Capability
(global) all had alphas of greater than .64, and after some item trimming
(Carmines & Zeller, 1979) the reliabilities ranged from .69 to .78. This was
considered to be very good, since two of these scales were developed for this
research. Never the less, some of the trimmed items were re-worded, and
items were added to the Urgency and Capability (global) scales to improve
future reliability.
The reliability of the subscales of the Capability (component) variable
was also assessed, and three of them, Financial, Human, and Organizational
had good reliabilities ranging from .72 to .87. The Technological subscale
only had a reliability of .36 and so was changed by keeping the two items that
had the highest inter-correlation and rewording the other two.
A second
questionnaire.

pre-test was then

conducted

using the

modified

Questionnaires were distributed to top management

personnel of restaurants in a moderately large, southern city (twelve usable
responses were received).

Results from this second pre-test indicated the

favorable impact of the previously discussed changes.
The alphas for the Urgency, Understanding, and Capability (global)
scales ranged from .72 to .88. Ironically, the two new scales, Urgency and
Capability (alphas = .88 & .86 respectively), performed better than did the
Understanding scale (alpha = .72), which was based on Milliken (1990). The
Understanding scale's reliability was still considered adequate, however.
The Capability (component) subscales performed even better, with
alphas ranging from .79 (for Human) to .97 (for Financial).

The

Organizational subscale had an alpha of .89, while the Technology subscale
had an alpha of .90, which was much improved.

These reliabilities were
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higher than expected, since each of these subscales had been developed for
this research.
No changes were made because these results were very good.

The

generally higher reliabilities were due to the changes made based on the
first pre-test, as well as the use of actual restaurant managers who were more
intimately familiar with the issues in question than the MBA students were.
The expert panel questionnaire was pre-tested on a set of fo u r
individuals, two who were familiar with the restaurant industry through
work experience, and two others who had academic qualifications in the
management area, as well as extensive work experience. Changes were made
to the expert panel questionnaire based on their recommendations and on
the recommendations of faculty colleagues who examined it. Some comments
indicated that the definitions for magnitude, activeness, and locus were too
brief, and these were lengthened and examples added.
"activeness"

and

"locus" were changed on the

Also, the terms

questionnaire

to

"responsiveness" and "focus" to make these constructs easier to comprehend.
(The original wording will be used in this paper, however.)
Population and sample. The population of interest is restaurants listed
in the SIC code of 5812 -- Eating Places, that were in existence for at least a
year before the spring of 1990 when Phil Sokolof ran his attention-grabbing
advertisements and forced the issue of nutrition to the forefront.
Organizations started after the spring of 1990 were not in existence to have
been able to respond to this issue (although their existence may have been a
response to the issue).

Although the one-year time lim it is somewhat

arbitrary, organizations that were not in existence for at least a year before
the issue strongly emerged were still going through the difficulties of start
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up quite unconnected to the issue of nutrition and would provide very noisy
data.
The sample was drawn from several sources. The basic criterion for
including a company in the sample was whether information could be found
listing the names and positions of executives of the firms in question.
Initially, a list of franchise restaurants was collected from the January 1993
issue of E n tre p re n e u r magazine, which publishes a list of franchise
organizations every January.

The 1993 Entrepreneur list includes 216

different establishments under its "fast-food" category and 65 under its
"restaurant" category, yielding a total of 281 potential respondent firms. This
list was supplemented by The Franchise Source Book (Bond & Bond, 1993)
which contained information on restaurant firms.
These companies were sent a letter requesting a copy of their UFOC
(Uniform Franchise Offering Circular).

The UFOC is a document that

companies selling franchises are required to supply to prospective
franchisees.

It is generally a very lengthy document, which contains

information on all aspects of the company, including a listing of the top
managers along with their job titles and work experience.

Sixty-one

companies responded by sending their UFOCs, a low response rate explained
by the size of these documents: it can be expensive to mail to everyone
requesting a copy. For this reason, many of these companies only send UFOCs
to individuals or companies that can demonstrate a significant interest in
buying a franchise.
Since this list of companies was clearly inadequate in size, and since it
only contained companies that franchise, alternative sources were consulted.
Two reference works, The Directory of Corporate Affiliations: Who Owns Who.
and Standard & Poor's Register of Corporations. Directors, and Executives.
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were consulted. These contain information on the identity and background
of corporate executives and officers of both publicly traded and privately
held companies or their subsidiaries.

Standard & Poor's Register also

contains information on executive tenure and so is useful in determining
which executives were employed by the company at the time in question.
Next, executive-level individuals were identified who were with the
company at the beginning of 1990 and who were also involved with the SIM
system or the nutrition awareness issue in some fashion. Although in many
cases the list of executives limited the amount of choice that was possible, the
relevant job titles were public affairs, planning, market research or market
communications (Lenz & Engledow, 1986). To this list of positions involved
with the SIM system can be added those with overall responsibility, such as
president, chief executive officer, chief operating officer, and chief
information officer.

Corporate officers were also considered to be possible

informants, due to their awareness of the strategic decisions and responses
made by the firm. These individuals ought to be familiar with the nutrition
issue and the responses that their organization implemented. One thousand
six hundred eighteen names were collected from 461 different restaurant
companies.
Data

collection.

organizational

Once the list of names and addresses of the

informants was collected, a copy of the pre-tested

questionnaire, a cover letter explaining the research and requesting
cooperation, and a self-addressed stamped envelope were mailed to each
individual.

Questionnaires were mailed to several individuals in each

organization, increasing the likelihood that at least one response would be
obtained from each company.

This procedure was necessary since
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individuals may be less likely to return questionnaires addressing issues
several years old.
The ideal would be to have several respondents from . each
organization. Data from "single-respondent" organizations, however, should
still

have

adequate reliability

because of the

shared

meanings,

understandings and belief systems present in organizations, particularly at
higher levels (Smircich, 1983; Walsh & Fahey, 1986; Ginsberg, 1990). Also,
those who were interested enough in the nutrition issue to complete and
return a questionnaire would probably have had intimate involvement with
the organization's interpretation of it or response to it and should have been
knowledgeable as to the particulars of their company's activities.
The data for the response measures (the dependent variables) were
collected from the expert panel. This panel had two individuals familiar with
business management in the restaurant industry, and two individuals
familiar with business management through academic experience.
were different individuals than those used in the pre-test.)

(These

The expert-

assigned ratings were used to determine the degree of magnitude, locus, and
activeness present in each organization's set of responses.
Analysis Procedures
Multiple regression analysis is the appropriate technique for testing
the hypotheses. Regression is appropriate when the dependent variable is
quantitative and the independent variables are either quantitative or
categorical (Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1985). For example, response locus
(dependent variable) is associated with more than one predictor variable,
these being issue capability and understanding.

In this case, the partial

regression coefficient of issue capability reflects the partial effect o f
capability on response locus while the effect of the other independent
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variable held constant (Neter, et. al., 1985: 229). The dependent variables are
the issue response dimensions (Magnitude, Locus,

Activeness,

and

Immediacy) and the independent variables are the stock assessments
(Urgency, Understanding, Capability).
Hypotheses 4d through 4f were tested by examining interaction terms
between the different independent variables (for example, Urgency X
Understanding).

In this case, the three independent variables would be

entered together, followed by the square terms of the variables in the
interaction terms (following Venkatraman [1989] and Cortina [1993]), with
the interaction terms being entered last.

In this hierarchical regression

procedure (Cohen & Cohen, 1983) the interaction term is only considered to
be significant if it can explain a statistically significant amount of variance
in the dependent variable beyond that explained by the variables entered in
the previous two steps.
Summary
Chapter 4 included the methodology used in this dissertation.

The

restaurant industry was selected due to its ubiquity in American life and its
consequent visibility and susceptibility to various strategic issues.

The

strategic issue of consumer nutrition awareness was selected for study
because of its readily identifiable history, timing, and salience to the
restaurant industry. The measures used in this study was then presented.
Data for the independent, interpretation, variables were collected by
questionnaires mailed to executives at restaurants. Response Capability was
measured two ways, globally and by its components. Data for the dependent,
response, variables were collected from these executives, as well, but
calculated using information from an expert panel that rated each response
along three of the four response dimensions.

Due to the various ways of
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conceptualizing the response variables, each of them was measured in
various ways.
Due to the nature of the topic under investigation, retrospective data
was collected. While there are difficulties with using this kind of data, the
problems with it can be minimized through certain
techniques which were discussed.

methodological

The questionnaire was pre-tested twice,

and the measures were found to have acceptable levels of reliability. The
steps taken to collect the names of executives were then identified. Multiple
regression was used to test the hypotheses, it being the appropriate analytic
technique for the kind of data collected.
Chapter 5 addresses the analysis of the results.
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Chapter 5 - Analysis and Results
This chapter begins with discussions of the variable measures and the
response rate and statistical power of the tests.
regression equations are presented.

Then, the results of the

This chapter concludes by briefly

reviewing the findings and determining to what degree the hypotheses were
supported.
Research Variables
Independent variables. Questionnaires were mailed to executive-level
managers in 461 companies in the eating places (SIC 5812) industry.

One

hundred nine usable responses were received from eighty-eight companies
for an organization-level response rate of almost 19%. This is somewhat low
compared to the response rates of 38.5% in Thomas, et. al. (1993) and of 27%
in Greening and Gray (1994), both of which addressed similar issues and used
mail-out questionnaires. This may be due to the retrospective nature of the
questionnaire.

Questionnaires involving events in the past are less likely to

be returned and given this, 19% is a reasonably good response rate (D. J.
Power, personal communication, May 9, 1994). Never the less, this raises the
issue of respondent bias, and this is addressed in a section below.
The job titles (level in the hierarchy) and functional areas of the
respondents are listed in Table 3. Given the small size of many restaurant
organizations, some of the job titles (supervisor, director of . . ., etc.) are at
high positions in the organizational hierarchy even though they may not
sound like it.

The large proportion of respondents in the areas closely

related to responding to the nutrition issue (Operations, Marketing, Food &
Beverage, Research & Development) indicates that the majority of responses
were

received

from individuals closely involved with

the

day-to-day

72
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Table 3 - Respondents' Level in the Hierarchy and
Functional Area
Level In Hierarchy fbv Title)
Chairman, Board Member
President
Chief Executive Officer
Chief Officer
Senior Vice President
Executive Vice President
Vice President
Director o f . . .
Manager/Supervisor
Staff
Functional Area
Top Level (General)
Operations
Marketing
Franchising
Food & Beverage
Research & Development
Finance
Purchasing/Distribution
Human Resources
Law

Number
5
14
14
4
7
6
22
23
14
5
Number
21
18
13
9
8
8
6
5
4
1

Note - Totals do not sum to 109 because of missing
data on some questionnaires.

activities of their respective firms and would be familiar with their
responses to the nutrition issue.
The questionnaire was divided into four sections.

The first section

contained general questions designed to help the respondents recall events
of several years ago. The second section contained items for the independent
variable scales: Urgency, Understanding, and Capability.

These variables

were operationalized by summing the items for each respective scale. The
third section contained items designed to measure capability by assessing its
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components.

The

components

assessed

were

human

resources,

organizational resources, financial resources, and technological resources.
These variables were operationalized by summing the items in their
respective scales, as well. The fourth section was designed to gather data on
the dependent variables and is discussed below.
Reliability and scale assessment. The inter-item reliability of the issue
assessment scales in the organizational informant questionnaire was assessed
by Cronbach's alpha (Cronbach, 1951) as recommended by Venkatraman and
Grant (1986). Alpha coefficients much below alpha = .7 indicate a possible
problem with a scale, that being the standard cutoff for adequate reliability
in exploratory settings, while alpha = .8 is suggested for theory testing
(Nunnally, 1978).

Given the newness of the scales employed, the lower

hurdle is deemed to be the more appropriate one.

Table 4 contains the

reliability coefficients for the independent variables.
As can be readily seen, the reliability coefficients for all the scales
except Understanding meet or exceed the alpha = .70 guidelines suggested by
Nunnally (1978) (and Understanding is close), and thus exhibited good
psychometric properties. Initially, the Understanding scale had 7 items, but
one item had negative, although slight, correlations with two other scale
items.

For this reason, the item was dropped to reduce the noise in the

measure (Carmines & Zeller, 1979). Trimming this item improved the scale's
reliability marginally.

Understanding was close enough to the alpha = .70

hurdle that it was still included in this study but since this scale did not meet
the alpha = .70 hurdle, the results obtained by using it should be interpreted
with caution. This scale also exhibited lower reliability than the others in
the pre-tests.
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Dependent variables. A panel of six experts, four individuals familiar
with the restaurant industry through work experience and two individuals
familiar with academic management, was formed. The expert questionnaire
consisted of the same list of possible restaurant responses that was included
in the restaurant respondent questionnaire. The experts were asked to rate
each possible response as to its degree of magnitude, locus (higher ratings
indicated a more external locus), and activeness.

Table 4 - Reliability Analysis for the
Independent Variables
Scale Name

Items in Scale

Alpha Coefficient

Urgency

8

.83

Understanding

6

.67

Capability (Global)

7

.88

Finance

4

.90

Organization

5

.81

Human

3

.73

Technology

4

.82

Capability (Component)

16

.90

Two rounds were conducted. One industry expert failed to return a
completed questionnaire in the first round and was dropped. This left the
final panel with three industry experts and the two academic experts. At the
end of the first round, median responses were calculated (following the
procedure in Dalkey & Hclmer [1963]) and these were indicated on the
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questionnaires that were sent out for the second round. The experts were
advised to complete the questionnaire again, taking into account both the
median rating and their initial rating. The median rating was taken again
for each item and this value was used in subsequent analysis.
Of the five questionnaires that were returned at the end of the second
round, only four were used to calculate the final median values. The fifth
questionnaire was returned quite late and exhibited a large number of
"irrational responses." In a Delphi panel, experts give an initial opinion that
is followed by additional rounds where they can modify this opinion by
taking into account the opinions of the other panel members.

An expert

using the information available to them would tend to alter his or her initial
assessment in the direction of the group median or mean. An individual who
lowers their rating of magnitude, for example, when the group median was
higher than their initial estimate is probably not using the information
provided to them in a "rational" or anticipated manner.

An additional

instance would be an initially low rating being raised not only to the group
median, but past it (a 1 becoming a 3 when the group median was 2, for
example).
The fifth expert demonstrated an unusually high tendency to answer
in this fashion. In fact, this individual answered in this "odd" manner more
times than the other four experts combined, 42 versus 41. Also, the faculty
member who was the contact person for these experts had suspicions that the
fifth expert did not actually complete the questionnaire himself the second
time. The faculty member reached this conclusion based on his knowledge of
some difficulties that the fifth expert was going through at the time
concerning bankruptcy and starting a new business. Since this would seem
to significantly increase the amount of noise in the measure (the ratio of the
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subjective component of the measure to the objective component [Reaves,
1992]), this individual's questionnaire was not included in the calculation of
the final expert panel medians.
Using these expert-derived

values,

the

dependent

variables

(magnitude, locus, and activeness) were constructed as follows. The fourth
section of the questionnaire mailed to restaurant executives contained a list
of possible responses that their respective organizations could have taken.
They were asked to indicate which responses they had implemented and the
month and year they had started each one. Appendix F contains the number
of companies in the sample that implemented each of the 38 responses on the
list.

A close examination of this appendix will reveal that every response

listed was implemented by at least one company, indicating the items on the
list were quite relevant to restaurants responding to the nutrition awareness
issue.
The different operationalizations of Magnitude, Locus, and Activeness
were measured as follows.

Each response on the list of 38 responses was

assigned three ratings: the expert median score for magnitude, locus, and
activeness.

If the median rating for a response was a 1 or 2, that response

was classified as either small, internal, or passive, depending on the purpose
of that rating. If the median rating for a response was a 3 or 4, that response
was classified as either large, external, or active, depending on what that
rating was for. If the median rating was 2.5, the response was not classified
since 2.5 represented the exact midpoint between a rating of 1 (very small,
for example) and a rating of 4 (very large). Measured in this way, a response
might be large but passive, active but internal, and so on.

Appendix G

contains a listing of how many of the 38 responses were classified large
versus small, external versus internal, and active versus passive.
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A significant proportion of the responses were not classified because
their ratings were 2.5. A mean rating of 2.5 indicated that the experts were
quite evenly divided on the nature of a particular aspect of the focal
response. The omissions of such responses assured that only responses seen
as unambiguously large, or external, or active, for example, were included in
the calculation of these variables.

This strengthens the validity of these

measures.
Magnitude was operationalized in three ways: 1) the number of
responses implemented (MAGNUMBR); 2) the sum of the expert magnitude
medians for all responses that were implemented (MAGRATIN); and 3) the
ratio of the number of large responses implemented to the number of small
responses (LAR/SMA).
two identical ways:

1

Locus and Activeness were each operationalized in
) the ratio of the number of external (or active)

responses to the number of internal (or passive) responses (EXT/INT and
ACT/PAS, respectively); and 2) the number of external (or active) responses
implemented (EXTNUMBR and ACTNUMBR, respectively).
Other operationalizations of Magnitude, Locus, and Activeness were
attempted, but were not included because of severe residual term non
normality. For the three dependent variables mentioned above, the average
magnitude, locus, and activeness ratings were calculated for each company.
All three of these measures were negatively skewed (skewness coefficients of
-2.03, -1.89, and -2.04, respectively) and extremely peaked (kurtosis
coefficients of 3.47, 3.21, and 3.34, respectively).

Residual analysis of the

regressions using these average measures as dependent variables exhibited a
very non normal residual pattern. To salvage these measures and allow them
to still be used, a Box-Cox transformation (Box & Cox, 1964) was employed to
identify the optimum power transformation to employ on the dependent
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variables.

Fifth- and sixth-order power transformations were required to

minimize the error sum of squares, the Box-Cox selection criterion.

Since

interpretation of power transformations on this order can be problematic,
and since other, more suitable, operationalizations of these three dependent
variables were employed, the results involving these variables were not
reported.
Immediacy, the fourth dependent variable, was operationalized
independently of the expert ratings in two ways. First, the number 1990 was
subtracted from the year of the first response the organization implemented
(IMMYEAR). If they implemented no responses, the year of response was set
to 1995. Second, the identical procedure was used but was denominated in
months and not years (IMMONTH). The results did not differ whether years
or months were used, and so only one set of results for the different
operationalizations was reported, those using years (IMMYEAR).
Response rate and statistical power. One hundred nine questionnaires
were returned from individuals in 89 different companies. This was after a
significant follow-up effort was implemented. A follow-up letter was mailed
to each potential respondent two weeks after the questionnaires were mailed.
Several weeks after that, an effort was made to call all the potential
respondents who had not yet returned a questionnaire. Then, several weeks
later, those executives who indicated that they would try to return a
questionnaire were called again.
Given the organizational level of analysis, the effective sample size for
determining statistical power is 89. Power considerations have traditionally
been overlooked in strategic management research and Mazen, Hemassi, and
Lewis (1987) recommend that these issues be addressed a priori.

Power

calculations were made before sending out the questionnaires to determine
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the number of responses needed for good statistical power. Cohen (1977) was
used as a guide, and the chance of a type I error (incorrectly concluding
statistical significance) was set at alpha = .05. The chance of a type II error
(incorrectly concluding statistical non significance) should be four times as
great, beta = .20 (Mazen, et. al., 1987). The target statistical power is then (1 beta) = .80. The necessary sample size was computed using this desired level
of statistical power, assuming a medium effect size (meaning an anticipated
r-square statistic in the teens), and taking into account the number of
independent variables in the regression equations.

Using the regression

equation with the most independent variables (dependent variable =
response activeness: six independent variables), the required sample size was
approximately n = 115. Given that most of the R-squares of the regression
were in the twenties (hence the effects are somewhat stronger than what
Mazen, et. al. (1987) termed "medium"), being 26 short of 115 should not
represent a severe power problem. Low statistical power means that chances
of Type II errors (incorrectly concluding statistical non significance) would
be enhanced.

The frequency of significant relationships in the regression

analyses would indicate that the merely marginal statistical power of the
tests did not cause this to happen very frequently.
Response bias. Given the somewhat anemic response rate (19%), it is
important to check for response bias. In other words, is the sample included
in this study representative of the restaurants to which questionnaires were
sent? Data on three important variables, size (measured in number of units),
sales (in millions of dollars) and restaurant type (fast food versus non-fast
food) were gathered from the 1991 Directory of Chain Restaurant Operators.
The most relevant size measure for restaurants is number of outlets, since
this measure, more than sales or profits, would indicate the visibility of such
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a restaurant to publicity and notoriety related to the nutrition issue. Never
theless, sales was also included, as was restaurant type, in order to examine
potential sample nonrepresentativeness along several important dimensions.
Data for these variables was collected on only 71 responding firms and
175 nonresponding firms because data on the other firms was not in the
Directory. There were no significant differences between respondent and
nonrespondent firms on any of the three dimensions.

Responding firms

were slightly smaller (373 units versus 477 units) than nonresponding firms
and also had lower sales ($252 M versus $503 M). Neither of these differences
was significant, however (t-values were .567 and 1.169, respectively). Fortysix percent of the responding firms were fast food, while only 39% of the
nonresponding firms were, but this was not a significant difference, either
(t-value = .986). Thus, the sample seems to be representative.
Results
The correlations of both the interpretation and response variables are
contained in Tables 5 through 7, along with the mean and standard deviation
of each. Table 5 contains the descriptive statistics for the independent
variables.

Table

6

contains the descriptive statistics for the dependent

variables. Table 7 contains the correlations between the independent and
dependent variables.
As can be readily determined, the correlations between the response
variables are, with the exception of IMMONTH and IMMYEAR, highly
correlated with each other.

Responses that were large in magnitude also

seemed to be external in focus as well as very active.

This coherence

between these variables is not unexpected but the magnitude of the
correlations

is notable.

The immediacy variables exhibit negative

correlations because earlier responses are scaled lower than later responses.
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Those companies that had early responses also tended to have large, external,
and active response sets.
Urgency is highly, positively correlated with all the response
variables, a result that will be shown to be robust in the regression
discussion to follow. Capability and Understanding are highly correlated,
which was expected, given that Dutton and Duncan (1987) presented these
two assessments as parts of feasibility.

The positive correlation is

interesting, in a way, given that Understanding and Capability usually had
different signs in the regression equations.

Tolerances for the regression

equations were well within acceptable limits on these two variables so this
result was probably not due to multicollinearity.
Understanding was negatively correlated with most of the response
variables, a result opposite of what was expected. Although not statistically
significant here, they become so in the regression equations. Capability was
positively correlated with most of the response variables.
The global measure of Capability was positively correlated with the
four Capability component measures, which was to be expected. They also
were

significantly

correlated

with each other.

These significant

correlations may have caused a problem with multicollinearity in the
regressions but the tolerances were within acceptable limits on these
variables (from .32 to .80). The strong correlation between Technology and
Organization is interesting given that these two variables often exhibited
different signs, and significantly so, in the regressions. Without exception,
these were the only two component variables that were correlated with any
of the response variables. The two component measures not correlated with
each other were Finance and Human.
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Table 5 - Descriptive Statistics
Independent Variables

Mean

S Dev

1

1

.

Urgency

25.92

5.60

2

.

Understanding 16.27

3.58

.116

2

3

4

5

3. Capability

24.30

5.88

.239*

.422***

4.

13.83

3.42

.233*

.213*

.379***

11.82

2.29

.095

.157

.350***

.568***

18.42

3.84

.1801

.146

***

.6 5 9 ***

12.79

4.51

.071

.033

Technology

5. Human
6

. Organization

7.

Finance

Note
***
**
*
t

4 3 4

.309**

3 6 9

***

6

.7 5 4 ***
.132

.348***

- All significance tests are two-tailed.
- Significant at alpha = .001
- Significant at alpha = .01
- Significant at alpha = .05
- Significant at alpha = .10
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Table

6

- Descriptive Statistics

Dependant Variables

Mean

S Dev

9.77

5.76

19.84

13.12

3. LAR/SMA

.06

.05

.8 7 1 *** .894***

4. IMMYEAR

-.61

2.92

.4 0 9 *** .409***

-.290**

5. IMMONTH

-1.76

34.77

-.4 1 3 *** .412***

-.296**

1. MAGNUMBR
2. MAGRATIN

6

. EXT/INT

7. EXTNUMBR
8

. ACT/PAS

9. ACTNUMBR

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

.9 9 6 ***

.997***

.1 2

.1 2

.9 1 5 *** .915***

.8 4 4 *** .4 0 0 ***

.409***

3.31

2 .6 8

.9 3 5 *** .935***

.8 2 5 *** .424***

.433***

.9 8 4 ***

.16

.9 7 3 *** .973***

.9 0 6 *** .3 6 3 ***

.368***

.9 1 1 ***

.914***

3.55

.9 6 7 *** .967***

.8 6 4 *** .3 6 1 ***

.365***

.8 5 5 ***

. 8 8 8 ***

.2 1

5.54

Note • All significance tests are two-tailed.
- Significant at alpha = .001
* *
- Significant at alpha = .01
★
- Significant at alpha = .05
- Significant at alpha = .10
* * *

8

.976***
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Table 7 - Correlations Between Dependant and Independent Variables

Urgency

Understanding

Capablity

Technology

Human

1. MAGNUMBR

.4 08***

-.064

.229*

.225*

.138

.046

-.080

2. MAGRATIN

.4 06***

-.065

.229*

.224*

.143

.043

-.090

3. LAR/SMA

.298**

.033

.248*

.215*

.093

.004

-.116

Organization

Finani

4. IMMYEAR

-.141

-.126

-.070

-.006

-.115

-.003

.079

5. IMMONTH

-.139

-.118

-.080

.004

-.106

.005

.071

. EXT/INT

.3 45***

-.093

.180t

.215*

.147

.065

-.057

7. EXTNUMBR

.394***

-.062

•187f

.204t

.133

.068

-.060

. ACT/PAS

.4 09***

-.091

.240*

.197f

.129

.007

-.114

.4 21***

-.081

.216*

.176

.107

-.003

-.114

6

8

9. ACTNUMBR

Note
***
**
*
t

- All significance tests are two-tailed.
- Significant at alpha = .001
- Significant at alpha = .01
- Significant at alpha = .05
- Significant at alpha = .10
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The results of the regression equations are contained in Tables 7
through 14.

Each table contains two different models for each dependent

variable. Model 1 is a hierarchical, polynomial, moderated regression model
including the stock assessments of Urgency, Understanding, and Capability;
the three squared terms, and the three interaction terms.
Hierarchical regression methodology allows the effects of additional
independent variables on the dependent variable to be assessed after the
effects of an initial independent variable or variables have been previously
assessed and held constant. It is so named because independent variables, or
sets of variables, are entered in a hierarchy through different steps.

A

special statistic, A R-square, is calculated which identifies the additional
explanatory contribution attributable to the new variable or variables.

If

not statistically significant, A R-square indicates that the additional
independent variables do not add sufficient explanatory power to the model
to warrant their inclusion or the interpretation of their effects.
The regression is also in a polynomial form because it contains
squared terms. After the stock assessment variables are entered in the first
level of the hierarchy, the squares of these three terms are entered in the
second level as a precondition for testing interactions effects. This second
step is necessary to hold constant any nonlinear effects that may bias the
interaction terms (Cortina, 1993). It also determines if the relationship of the
stock assessments with the dependent variables is curvilinear in nature.
Significant t-values for these squared terms indicate the presence of such
curvilinearity.
The moderated nature of the regression model comes from testing
interactions between the stock assessments.

Significant, positive effects

indicate that the effect of one independent variable in the interaction is
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strengthened by high levels of the other variable and weakened by low
levels.

Significant, negative effects indicate an opposite effect.

All

interactions are hypothesized to be positive.
To reiterate, the variables were entered into the first model in three
steps. In Step 1 the three stock assessments were entered. In Step 2 the three
squared terms were entered.

In Step 3 the three interaction terms were

entered in two different ways. First, all three interaction terms were entered
as a block into the same regression equation and the summary statistics for A
R-square and its significance noted. Then, three additional regressions were
run in which each interaction was entered by itself because of severe
collinearity among the three interaction terms. This multicollinearity made
interpreting them individually problematic.

The regression coefficicents

for the interaction terms were taken from this last set of regressions.
An alternative methodology for dealing with multicollinearity is
suggested by Neter, et. al. (1985).

They recommend differencing the

collinear variables with respect to their means. While they state that this
should reduce multicollinearity substantially, and recommend the use of this
technique for situations involving polynomial and interaction terms, doing
so had no appreciable effect on reducing the multicollinearity.

Hence,

results using difference scores are not reported.
Model 2 consisted of the same stock assessments of Urgency and
Understanding used in Model 1, but the global stock assessment of Capability
was replaced by four component measures of capability: Organizational,
Technological, Human, and Financial.

These six variables were entered

together.
Weinzimmer, Mone, and Alwan (1994) noted the infrequent use of
regression diagnostics in management research.

They recommend that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

88
residual analysis be done to assess the validity of important regression
assumptions.

This analysis was run for each regression in this research.

With the exception of the residuals of the regressions using average
magnitude, locus, and activeness discussed above, no regression's residuals
exhibited significant signs of heteroscedasticity or non normality.

Thus

there was no reason to make any remedial adjustments and the regression
results are reported as they resulted from the initial regression runs.
Response magnitude. Hypothesis 1 posited that Understanding and
Capability would have a positive effect on Magnitude.

Capability was

measured two ways, globally and by assessing its components, and Magnitude
was operationalized in three ways, the number of responses (MAGNUMBR),
the summed magnitude rating of all the responses a company implemented
(MAGRATIN), and the ratio of large responses to small responses (LAR/SMA).
Therefore, six different regressions were run to test Hypothesis 1. Tables
through 10 contain the regression statistics for these equations.

8

Although

no relationships were suggested between Magnitude and Urgency, or any of
the interaction terms or squared terms, these were also included in the
analysis on an exploratory basis.
In Model 1, Capability was significantly positively related to
MAGNUMBR, MAGRATIN, and LAR/SMA at the .05 level of significance, thus
supporting Hypothesis 1. This means that as the assessment of Capability
increased, the number of responses rose, the overall magnitude of the
response set rose, and the responses that were implemented were more likely
to be large in magnitude.
Understanding, on the other hand, was significantly negatively
related to all three Magnitude ratings, the opposite of what was hypothesized.
Two of these relationships, with MAGNUMBR and MAGRATIN, were
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Table 8 - Regressions for MAGNUMBR
Independent
Variables

Step 1

Model 1
Step 2

Model 2
Step 3

.389***
(.102)

.413***
(.105)

Understanding

-.326f
(.171)

-.253
(.163)

Capability

.220*
(.107)

Urgency

Urg*Urg

.013
(.017)

Und*Und

.056*
(.027)

Cap*Cap

-.008
(.014)

Urg(RS)*Und

-.023
(.0 2 0 )

Urg(RS)*Cap

-.026
(.016)

Und*Cap

-.0 2 2

(.023)
Organization

-.465f
(.259)

Technological

.510*
(.234)

Human

.512
(.395)

Finance

-.171
(.141)

n
A R-square
F-score
Significance
***
**
*
t
Note -

87
.219
7.844
.000

87
.044
1.629
.189

87
.031
1.135
.340

82
.267
4.610
.0 0 1

- Significant at alpha = .001
- Significant at alpha = .01
- Significant at alpha = .05
- Significant at alpha = .10
Coefficients are regression coefficients with the standard error
reported below. A R-squares for Step 3 in Model 1 are for the 3
interaction terms entered as a block but, due to severe
multicollinearity between them, the coefficients are from separate
regressions run with each interaction entered by itself.
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Table 9 - Regressions for MAGRATIN
IndeDendent
Variables

Step 1

Model 1
Step 2

Model 2
Step 3

.880***
(.223)

.937*
(.238)

Understanding

-.748t
(.391)

-.583
(.369)

Capability

.503*
(.243)

Urgency

Urg*Urg

.0 2 2

(.038)
Und*Und

.129*
(.061)

Cap*Cap

-.016
(.033)

Urg(RS)*Und

-.056
(.045)

Urg(RS)*Cap

-.059
(.037)

Und*Cap

-.050
(.053)

Organization

-1.094t
(.587)

Technological

1.168*
(.532)

Human

1.246
(.898)

Finance

-.418
(.321)

n
A R-square
F-score
Significance
***
**
*
t
Note -

87
.217
7.773
.0 0 0

87
.043
1.567
.204

87
.032
1.172
.326

82
.271
4.707
.0 0 0

- Significant at alpha = .001
- Significant at alpha = .01
- Significant at alpha = .05
- Significant at alpha = .10
Coefficients are regression coefficients with the standard error
reported below. A R-squares for Step 3 in Model 1 are for the 3
interaction terms entered as a block but, due to severe
multicollinearity between them, the coefficients are from separate
regressions run with each interaction entered by itself.
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Table 10 - Regressions for LAR/SMA
IndeDendent
Variables

Step 1

Model 1
Step 2

Model 2
Step 3

Urgency

.0 0 2 *
(.0 0 1 )

.003**
(.0 0 1 )

Understanding

-.003*
(.0 0 2 )

-.0 0 2

Capability

(.0 0 2 )

.003*
(.0 0 1 )

Urg*Urg

.0 0 0

(.0 0 0 )
Und*Und

.0 0 0

(.0 0 0 )
Cap*Cap

.0 0 0

(.0 0 0 )
Urg(RS)*Und

-.0 0 0 *
(.0 0 0 )

Urg(RS)*Cap

-.0 0 0 *
(.0 0 0 )

Und*Cap

-.0 0 0

(.0 0 0 )
Organization

-004t
(.0 0 2 )

Technological

.006**
(.0 0 2 )

Human

.003
(.004)

Finance

-.0 0 2

(.0 0 1 )
n
A R-square
F-score
Significance
***
**
*
t
Note -

87
.169
5.700
.0 0 1

87
.027
.917
.437

87
.065
2.301
.084

82
.214
3.451
.005

- Significant at alpha = .001
- Significant at alpha = .01
- Significant at alpha = .05
- Significant at alpha = .10
Coefficients are regression coefficients with the standard error
reported below. A R-squares for Step 3 in Model 1 are for the 3
interaction terms entered as a block but, due to severe
multicollinearity between them, the coefficients are from separate
regressions run with each interaction entered by itself.
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significant at the .10 level, but the negative relationship with LAR/SMA was
significant at a = .05. This means that as Understanding increased, the
number of responses fell, the overall size of the response set dropped, and
companies were less likely to choose large responses as opposed to small ones.
The

consistency of these results across three different

measures of

Magnitude indicates this finding is robust. Thus, there is only mixed support
for Hypothesis 1.
Model 2 also offers very weak support for Hypothesis 1. Only one of
the component measures of Capability, Technological, was positively related
to Magnitude, although this was with all three Magnitude measures with at
least a .05 level of significance. As restaurant managers believed that their
knowledge and use of technology were more of a strength, their restaurant
was more likely to have more responses, a larger response set, and
implement more large responses in relation to small ones.
Organization Capability, however, was negatively related to Magnitude
in all three equations at the a = .10 level. This indicates that as restaurant
managers believed their systems, procedures, and administration were a
strength, the number of responses fell, the size of the response set was
smaller, and the ratio of large responses to small responses also decreased.
The component measures of Human and

Finance were

not

significantly related to Magnitude in any of the regressions. Understanding
was negatively correlated with Magnitude in Model 2, but in no case
reaching statistical significance.
Other findings of interest were the positive, significant relationship
that Urgency had with all three Magnitude measures.

Of the six positive,

significant correlations with measures of Magnitude (out of six possible),
four were significant at a = .001 (with MAGNUMBR and MAGRATIN) and the
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other two had significance levels of .05 or better. The positive correlations
mean that when Urgency was higher, restaurants implemented more
responses, a larger response set, and more large responses in relation to
smaller ones.

Urgency by far had the strongest relationships with

Magnitude of the three stock assessments, although this result was not
anticipated nor hypothesized.

These results will be discussed in greater

depth in Chapter 5.
The squared Understanding term was significantly positive in two of
the three regressions (see Tables 7 and
relationship with

Magnitude.

8

), indicating a curvilinear

Given the regression coefficients of

Understanding (negative) and Understanding squared (positive), the shape
of the relationship between Understanding and Magnitude is concave
upward, indicating a more complex relationship than that suggested by the
linear effect alone. By conducting a first-derivative test (Chiang, 1984), it is
possible to determine the point at which the quadratic term will overtake the
linear one and the relationship between Understanding and Magnitude
becomes positive (if at all within a feasible range).
The regression equation for MAGNUMBR and the two Understanding
terms (just including those two variables) is:
MAGNUMBR = -2.198 Und + .056 Und2. ( 1 )
(The regression coefficient for Und was taken from the equation in Step 2,
and is not shown in Table 7.)
To locate the minimum, the equation is differentiated with respect to
Understanding and set equal to 0. This yields:
dMAGNUMBR/dUnd = -2.198 + .112 Und = 0. (2)
Solving for Understanding yields the minimum of
Understanding = 2.198/. 112 = 19.625. (3)
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Thus, the relationship between Understanding and the number of
responses implemented is negative below 19.625 and positive above it. The
mean of Understanding is 16.26 and the standard deviation is 3.58.

By

locating on a Normal Table the area associated with a z-score of .94 (19.625 is
.94 standard deviations away from the mean), it can readily be determined
that only about 17% of the companies claimed to have had levels o f
understanding high enough to fall within the range where the relationship
with Magnitude was positive, as hypothesized.
Using the identical procedure for MAGRATIN, which Und*Und also had
a significant relationship with:
MAGRATIN = -5.048 Und+ .129 Und2. (4)
Differentiating and setting the result equal to zero:
dMAGRATIN/dUnd = -5.048 + .258 Und = 0. (5)
The minimum point at which the relationship with MAGRATIN turns
positive is: Und = 5.048/.258 = 19.565, an almost identical amount to that above.
The interpretation is the same, indicating that the relationship between
Understanding and Magnitude, while negative over most of the feasible
range of Understanding values, at very high levels of Understanding
(around the top 17%) turns positive.
Finally,

although

not

hypothesized,

two interaction

terms

Urg(RS)*Und and Urg(RS)*Cap were negatively, significantly correlated
with LAR/SMA, the ratio of large responses to small. The A R-square statistic
for Step 3 was significant at a = .10 (see Table 10). Given that Urg(RS) is
reverse scored, the interactions of both Capability and Understanding with
Urgency are positive.

This indicates the effect of Capability on Magnitude

(measured by LAR/SMA) is stronger at higher levels of Urgency, and that
the effect of Understanding on Magnitude (measured by LAR/SMA) is
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stronger at higher levels of Urgency. In response to Urgent interpretations,
both Capability and Understanding had a greater impact on the ratio of large
to small responses implemented. The reverse is also true. At higher levels of
both Understanding and Capability, the effect of Urgency on Magnitude
(measured by LAR/SMA) is also strengthened.
Response

im m ediacy.

Hypothesis 2 posited that U rg e n c y ,

Understanding, and Capability would have positive effects on Immediacy.
While Immediacy was operationalized in two ways, for the sake of brevity
only the results for IMMYEAR are reported here, since the results were
almost identical between the two operationalizations.
values of IMMYEAR indicate earlier responses.

Recall that lower

Again, the interaction and

squared terms were added into the equation, although no hypotheses were
posited concerning them. The regression statistics are reported in Table 11.
The results can be briefly summarized by stating that no relationship
was statistically significant.

Urgency, Understanding, or Capability

(regardless of how it was measured), did not in their linear, quadratic, or
interaction forms significantly affect IMMYEAR. The stock assessments have
no discernible effect on when a restaurant organization began to respond to
the strategic issue of consumer nutrition awareness. An investigation of the
significance of the F-scores also reveals that no part of Model 1 was
significant, and it was also insignificant as a whole.

The results were

essentially identical for IMMONTH and so are not reported here.
The reasons for this lack of significance may not involve a
straightforward and categorical rejection of the logic behind the hypotheses
but could involve methodology and the manner in which the focal strategic
issue unfolded slowly over time. This will be discussed in Chapter 5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

96
Table 11 - Regressions for IMMYEAR
IndeDendent
Variables

Step 1

Model 1
Step 2

Model
Step 3

Urgency

-.068
(.059)

-.081
(.062)

Understanding

-.094
(. 1 0 0 )

-.089
(.096)

Capability

.005
(.062)
-.008
(. 1 0 0 )

Urg*Urg
Und*Und

.0 0 1

(.016)
Cap*Cap

-.013
(.008)
.006
(.0 1 2 )

Urg(RS)*Und
Urg(RS)*Cap

.0 0 0

(.009)
Und*Cap

.0 0 0

(.014)
Organization

.137
(.153)

Technological

.060
(.138)

Human

-.336
(.233)

Finance

.025
(.083)

n
A R-square
F-score
Significance
***
**
*
t
Note

82
.032
.877
.457

82
.047
1.281
.287

82
.003
.067
.977

77
.068
.8 6 6

.524

- Significant at alpha = .001
- Significant at alpha = .01
- Significant at alpha = .05
- Significant at alpha = .10
- Coefficients are regression coefficients with the standard error
reported below. A R-squares for Step 3 in Model 1 are for the 3
interaction terms entered as a block but, due to severe
multicollinearity between them, the coefficients are from separate
regressions run with each interaction entered by itself.
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Response locus. Hypothesis 3 posited that both Understanding and
Capability would have a positive relationship with Locus (or externality of
response).

Locus was measured in two ways: EXT/INT, or the number of

external responses divided by the number of internal responses, and
EXTNUMBR, the number of external responses. The results of the regression
equation to test these relationships are presented in Tables 12 and 13. As
before, Urgency, the squared terms and the interactions are also included
and analyzed.
Capability was significantly correlated with only one Locus measure,
EXT/INT, at the .10 level of significance. This indicates that as the Capability
assessment was more favorable, restaurants tended to implement more
external responses in relation to the number of internal

responses.

Capability seemed to have no significant impact on the actual number of
external responses implemented.
The Technology Capability component was positively related to both
EXT/INT and EXTNUMBR, again at only the ,10 level of significance, indicating
that as restaurant managers' confidence in their knowledge and usage of
technology increased, the proportion of external responses to internal
responses increased, and the number of external responses increased. No
other Capability components were significantly related to either Locus
measure, although both Organizational and Finance capability had negative
regression coefficients in both cases, contrary to predictions. Overall, these
findings represent weak support for Hypothesis 3.
Understanding was negatively, significantly correlated with EXT/INT
in both models at a = .10 (see Table 12), meaning that as the Understanding
assessment increased, the proportion of external to internal responses
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Table 12 - Regressions for EXT/INT
IndeDendent
Variables
Urgency

Step 1

Model 1
Step 2

Model 2
Step 3

.007**
(.0 0 2 )

.007**
(.0 0 2 )

Understanding

-.007f
(.004)

-006f
(.003)

Capability

.004f
(.0 0 2 )

Urg*Urg

.0 0 0

(.0 0 0 )
Und*Und

.0 0 1 *
(.0 0 0 )

Cap*Cap

.0 0 0

(.0 0 0 )
Urg(RS)*Und

-.0 0 1

(.0 0 0 )
Urg(RS)*Cap

.0 0 0

(.0 0 0 )
Und*Cap

-.0 0 0

(.0 0 1 )
Organization

-.008
(.005)

Technological

.009t
(.005)

Human

.0 1 0

(.008)
Finance
n
A R-square
F-score
Significance
***
**
*
t
Note -

-.003
(.003)
87
.166
5.557

87
.063
2 .2 1 2

.0 0 2

.093

87
.032
1.127
.344

82
.2 1 1

3.388
.005

- Significant at alpha= .001
- Significant at alpha= .01
- Significant at alpha= .05
- Significant at alpha = .10
Coefficients are regression coefficients with the standard error
reported below. A R-squares for Step 3 in Model 1 are for the 3
interaction terms entered as a block but, due to severe
multicollinearity between them, the coefficients are from separate
regressions run with each interaction entered by itself.
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Table 13- Regressions for EXTNUMBR
Inderiendent
Variables
Urgency
Understanding
Capability

Step 1

Model 1
Step 2

Model
Step 3

.179***
(.048)

.185’'
(.050)

-.133
(.081)

-.1 1 0

(.078)

.079
(.050)

Urg*Urg

.003
(.0 1 0 )

Und*Und

.030*
(.0 1 2 )

Cap*Cap

-.0 0 1

(.007)
Urg(RS)*Und

-.0 1 2

(.009)
Urg(RS)*Cap

-.011
(.008)

Und*Cap

-.007
(.0 1 1 )

Organization

-.157
(.124)

Technological

.189t
(. 1 1 2 )

Human

.195
(.189)

Finance

-.069
(.068)

n
A R-square
F-score
Significance
***
**
*
t
Note -

87
.190
6.574
.0 0 1

87
.054
1.912
.134

87
.025
.877
.457

82
.225
3.668
.003

- Significant at alpha = .001
- Significant at alpha = .01
- Significant at alpha = .05
- Significant at alpha = .10
Coefficients are regression coefficients with the standard error
reported below. A R-squares for Step 3 in Model 1 are for the 3
interaction terms entered as a block but, due to severe
multicollinearity between them, the coefficients are from separate
regressions run with each interaction entered by itself.
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decreased, and the response set was more internal. This is directly opposite
of Hypothesis 3's prediction but is consistent with the finding of
Understanding's relationship with Magnitude. It was also negatively related
to EXTNUMBR, but not significantly.
Und*Und was positively, significantly correlated with both locus
variables,

again

identifying

a

curvilinear

relationship

between

understanding and locus. Since both Und and Und*Und were correlated only
with EXT/INT only the relationship of Understanding with this locus measure
will be examined. The regression equation for EXT/INT, including only the
Understanding terms (not all coefficients shown in Table 11) is:
EXT/INT = -.055 Und + .0014 Und2. (6 )
d(E/I)/dUnd = -.055 + .0028 Und = 0. (7)
Critical Point - Und = .055/.0028 = 19.64. ( 8 )
Given the signs of the terms, the shape of the function is concave up,
and that it reaches a minimum at Understanding = 19.64. Below this point the
relationship with EXT/INT is negative, above it is becomes positive. The mean
of Understanding is 16.27 and its standard deviation is 3.58. Again, only when
Understanding is very high (around 15-17% as before) does the relationship
with EXT/INT become positive as hypothesized. Below this point, increases in
Understanding are associated with a decreased proportion of external
responses to internal ones.

Above it, however, when the Understanding

assessment is very high, increases in Understanding lead to increases in the
proportion of external to internal responses.
As for the other variables not hypothesized to have a relationship with
locus, Urgency again had a strong, positive relationship with both measures.
Tables 11 and 12 show that the relationship was stronger with EXTNUMBR
than with EXT/INT. This means that the higher the assessment of Urgency
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the greater the proportion of external to internal responses and the larger
the number of external responses implemented.

In other words, in

increasingly urgent situations, restaurants responded in a more external
fashion. None of the interactions between the stock assessments and either
measure of response locus was significant.
Response activeness.

Hypothesis 4 posited positive relationships

between all three stock assessment and Activeness. It also posited positive
relationships

between the three interaction terms and Activeness.

Activeness was measured in two ways: ACT/PAS, the ratio of active responses
to passive responses, and ACTNUMBR, the number of active responses
implemented.

The results of these regression equations are presented in

Tables 14 and 15.
Urgency was significantly, positively correlated with Activeness in all
four models, meaning that the higher the assessment of Urgency the greater
the proportion of active responses to passive responses and the larger the
number of active responses.

Urgent interpretations led to a more active

response stance, providing strong support for Hypothesis 4.
Capability was also positively, significantly correlated with both
measures, although with ACTNUMBR at only a = .10, indicating that when
assessments of Capability were high, restaurants were more likely to have a
large number of active responses to passive ones and were also likely to have
a higher number of active responses. This significant result also provided
support for Hypothesis 4.
The components of Capability again provided mixed support.
Organizational Capability was negatively correlated with both Activeness
measures.

When restaurant managers thought their systems, procedures,
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Table 14 - Regressions for ACT/PAS
IndeDendent
Variables

Step 1

Model 1
Step 2

Model:
Step 3

o n ***
(.003)

.0 1 2 *
(.003)

Understanding

-.0 1 1 *
(.005)

-.008f
(.004)

Capability

.007*
(.003)

Urgency

Urg*Urg

.0 0 0

(.0 0 0 )
Und*Und

.0 0 2 *
(.0 0 1 )

Cap*Cap

-.0 0 0

(.0 0 0 )
Urg(RS)*Und

-.0 0 1

(.0 0 1 )
Urg(RS)*Cap

-.ooit
(.0 0 0 )

Und*Cap

-.0 0 0

(.0 0 0 )
Organization

-.016*
(.007)

Technological

.014*
(.006)

Human

.018
(.0 1 1 )

Finance

-.005
(.004)

n
A R-square
F-score
Significance

87
.237
8.693
.000

87
.044
1.663
.182

87
.039
1.503

82
.292
5.224

.2 2 0

.0 0 0

- Significant at alpha = .001
- Significant at alpha = .01
- Significant at alpha = .05
- Significant at alpha = .10
Note - Coefficients are regression coefficients with the standard error
reported below. A R-squares for Step 3 in Model 1 are for the 3
interaction terms entered as a block but, due to severe
multicollinearity between them, the coefficients are from separate
regressions run with each interaction entered by itself.
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Table 15 - Regressions for ACTNUMBR
Independent
Variables
Urgency

Step 1

Model 1
Step 2

Model!
Step 3

.251***
(.062)

.273*
(.064)

Understanding

-.215*
(.105)

-.165+
(. 1 0 0 )

Capability

.129t
(.065)

Urg*Urg

.003
(.0 1 0 )

Und*Und

.034*
(.016)

Cap*Cap

-.003
(.009)

Urg(RS)*Und

-.018
(.0 1 2 )

Urg(RS)*Cap

-.016
(.0 1 0 )

Und*Cap

-.014
(.014)

Organization

-.325*
(.158)

Technological

.279f
(.143)

Human

.348
(.241)

Finance

-.114
(.086)

n
A R-square
F-score
Significance

87
.230
8.377
.0 0 0

87
.039
1.430
.240

87
.034
1.253
.297

82
.284
5.014
.0 0 0

- Significant at alpha = .001
- Significant at alpha = .01
- Significant at alpha = .05
- Significant at alpha = .10
Note - Coefficients are regression coefficients with the standard error
reported below. A R-squares for Step 3 in Model 1 are for the 3
interaction terms entered as a block but, due to severe
multicollinearity between them, the coefficients are from separate
regressions run with each interaction entered by itself.
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and administration were a strength, they tended to have fewer active
responses in relation to passive ones and fewer active responses.

Thus,

perceived organizational strength tended to inhibit active responses.
Technological Capability was positively, significantly correlated with
both measures of Activeness but only marginally with ACTNUMBR.

The

greater the confidence in their knowledge and use of technology, the higher
the proportion of active to passive responses and the larger the number of
active responses.

Perceived strength in the technology area tended to

enhance activeness.
The other two component measures were both insignificant.

Taken

together, the component measures of Capability provide mixed support for
Hypothesis 4.
Understanding was negatively, significantly correlated with both
measures of Activeness at the .05 level for Model 1 and at the .10 level for
Model 2. Higher assessments of Understanding led to lower proportions of
active to passive responses and fewer active responses.

Tables 13 and 14

reveal that the relationship of Understanding with Activeness is curvilinear,
since Und*Und is significantly, positively correlated with both measures at
the .05 level. The first derivative test was employed again. The equations are
provided below.
ACT/PAS = -.065 Und + 0016 Und?. (9)
d(A/P)/dUnd = -.065 + .0032 Und = 0. (10)
Critical Point: Und = .065/.0032 = 20.31. (11)
The curve is concave, falling at Understanding values lower than 20.31
and rising thereafter.

When assessments of Understanding are low,

Understanding tends to have a negative impact of ACT/PAS: the higher the
assessed Understanding the lower the proportion of active to passive
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responses. After the critical point, however, this relationship reverses and
higher assessments of Understanding lead to a higher proportion of active to
passive responses.

Recall that the mean of Understanding is 16.27 and its

standard deviation is 3.58. This would indicate (using the Normal table again)
that the relationship between Understanding and ACT/PAS is negative in all
but the top 9% of the range of Understanding, where it is positive.
The identical calculations for ACTNUMBR follow.
ACTNUMBR = -1.348 Und + 0339 Und2. (12)
d(A/P)/dUnd = -1.348 + .0678 Und = 0. (13)
Critical Point: Und = 1.348/.0678 = 19.88. (14)
The minimum point is about the same here as previously and the
interpretation is the same.

The negative

relationship

between

Understanding and Activeness becomes positive in the top 15% range of
Understanding scores. This finding is not supportive of Hypothesis 4.
Of the six relationships between the three interaction terms and the
two Activeness measures, only one, Urg(RS)*Cap with ACT/PAS
significant, and that at only the

,1 0

was

significance level and in the opposite

direction of that hypothesized. All six correlations were negative, indicating,
given the reverse-scored nature of Urgency, that the interaction between
Urgency and Capability is positive.

The interpretation is identical to the

previous interactions: at higher levels of one variable, the effect of the
second variable on Activeness (measured as ACT/PAS) is stronger. At higher
levels of Urgency, Capability more strongly affects Activeness and vice
versa. The interaction terms provide no support for Hypothesis 4.
Summary of Significant Findings.
Table 16 contains a summary of the results of the hypotheses.

The

results are reviewed below.
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Hypothesis la found mixed support. Capability (global) was positively
related to response set Magnitude (measured three ways) at the .05
significance level.

Technological Capability was also positively related to

Magnitude at the .05 level in all three cases. Financial and Human Capability,
however, were not related to Magnitude at all, and Organizational Capability
was negatively related to Magnitude at the .10 level of significance in all
three cases, opposite of expectations.

The higher the perception of

Organization Capability the lower the magnitude of response.
Hypothesis lb was rejected. Not only was Understanding not positively
related to response set Magnitude, it was negatively related to it at the .05
level of significance in all three Model 1 regressions. (It was negatively, but
not significantly, correlated with the Magnitude measures in Model 2.) This
finding is directly contrary to what was hypothesized and indicates that the
more executives believed they understood the nutrition awareness issue, the
less they responded to it.

The relationship with Magnitude exhibited

curvilinearity, however: it turned positive in the top 15% range o f
Understanding scores. Understanding squared was positively related to two
of the Magnitude measures. Within this range, the hypothesized positive
relationship obtained.
Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c were all rejected.

Immediacy was not

affected by Urgency, Understanding, or Capability (regardless of how it was
operationalized). This lack of significance was a surprising result, given the
strong theoretical and intuitive appeal of these proposed effects. The issue of
timing and how this particular issue evolved may have had an impact on
these results.
Hypothesis 3a was rejected: Understanding did not positively affect
response Locus regardless of how it was measured. In fact, it was negatively,
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significantly correlated with one of the Locus measures.

This result

exhibited curvilinearity again, however, turning positive in the upper 15%
range of Understanding scores.
Table 16 - Summary of Results
Hypothesis la: Cap -> Mag

Mixed - global had a positive effect,
components both positive and
negative

Hypothesis lb: Und -> Mag

Rejected - negative, significant
effect; positive curvilinear effect

Hypothesis 2a: Urg -> Imm

Rejected - no significant
relationships

Hypothesis 2b: Und -> Imm

Rejected - no significant
relationships

Hypothesis 2c: Cap -> Imm

Rejected - no significant
relationships

Hypothesis 3a: Und -> Loc

Rejected - negative, significant
effect; positive curvilinear effect

Hypothesis 3b: Cap -> Loc

Moderate - global had a positive,
significant effect, as did one
component measure

Hypothesis 4a: Urg -> Act

Strong support - positive, significant
at the .001 level

Hypothesis 4b: Und -> Act

Rejected - negative, significant
effect; positive curvilinear effect

Hypothesis 4c: Cap -> Act

Mixed - global had a positive effect,
components both positive and
negative

Hypothesis 4d: Und*Cap -> Act

Rejected - no significant
relationships

Hypothesis 4e: Und*Urg -> Act

Rejected - no significant
relationships

Hypothesis 4f: Cap*Urg -> Act

Rejected - relationship opposite that
hypothesized
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Hypothesis 3b obtained moderate support.

Capability (global) was

positively correlated with only one Locus measure, although marginally.
Technological Capability was significantly related to both measures of Locus
at the .10 level of significance. None of the other component measures had a
significant regression coefficient. Generally, the greater the assessment of
Capability, the more external the response set.
Hypothesis 4a was supported at the .001 level of significance. Urgency
had a strong, positive effect on both measures of response activeness: the
higher the urgency of the issue the more active the response set. Urgency
also was significantly, positively related to Magnitude and Locus, also,
although this was not hypothesized. The impact of Urgency on the response
variables (except for Immediacy) was the most consistent and strongest
finding in this study. The higher the assessment of Urgency, the larger the
magnitude of the response set, the more externally focused the response set,
and the more active the response set.
Hypothesis 4b was not supported.

Not only was Understanding not

positively related to either measure of Activeness, it was significantly,
negatively related to both.

Again, however, the relationship was a

curvilinear one as Understanding squared was related to both measures
positively and significantly. Over most of the range of Understanding, the
relationship with Activeness was negative, but in around the top 15% of the
range of Understanding scores the relationship turned positive.

The

curvilinearity of the relationship of Understanding with the response
variables was an interesting and robust finding.
Hypothesis 4c obtained mixed support. While Capability (global) was
positively related to both measures of Activeness, as was Technological
Capability, Organization Capability was negatively related to them.
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Confidence in the technology prowess of the organization led to a more
active response set while confidence in administrative skill had the opposite
effect.

While the relationship between Technological Capability with

Activeness was framed in causal terms, it may be spurious since
organizations that are more likely to respond actively are also more likely to
be more technologically competent due to a more proactive and pioneering
attitude toward new trends and innovation.

The Organization Capability

result may address organizational inertia issues.

It is interesting to recall

that these two capability measures were positively correlated.
Hypotheses 4d, 4e and 4f were not supported. None of the interactions
was positively related to either measure of Activeness, and one was
significantly, negatively correlated, albeit at a = .10. This would seem to
indicate that the threat rigidity hypothesis suggested by Staw, et. al. (1981) is
not supported in this case.

Strictly speaking, however, threat rigidity

suggests a curvilinear relationship with Response Activeness, which would
require testing the squared terms of the interactions.
although not reported.

This test was done,

None of the regression coefficients of these terms

approached statistical significance.
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Chapter 6 - Discussion and Implications
This dissertation addressed strategic issue management and the
relationship between strategic issue interpretation and response.

The

literature on these topics was reviewed and a model constructed. The link
between interpretation and response was explored in greater depth and four
hypotheses posited which delineated this link in greater detail.

To some

extent, three of the four hypotheses found support, but aspects of each could
be rejected outright.
This dissertation fills a gap in the literature by examining how
organizations in a single-industry responded to an actual strategic issue
based on their interpretations of it. The idea that interpretation influences
response has not gone without empirical support or previous investigation,
however.

For example, Dutton and Dukerich

(1991)

examined this

relationship, but only in a single organization. Dutton and Webster (1988)
also investigated this relationship, but used an artificial in-basket simulation
methodology. Schneider & de Meyer (1991) investigated the effect of culture
on this relationship, but used a case study and executive informants in a non
organizational setting. Thomas, et. al. (1993) also used case-studies in their
data collection in the hospital industry that, while realistic, were still
artificial.

They also used a different framework, opportunity-threat, than

the one used here; a framework that, while very popular, under emphasizes
considerations of feasibility (understanding and capability)

in

the

interpretation process. This dissertation thus makes a unique contribution to
the area of strategic issue management and interpretation.

Its contribution

is mainly descriptive rather than normative, just as much of the research on
SIM has been, given that performance outcomes were not measured.
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The meaning and relevance of these findings will be discussed, along
with other significant findings that emerged which were not hypothesized.

Methodological Issues and Caveats
Before continuing with this discussion, several caveats should be
addressed and some interpretational (related to the findings of this study)
and methodological issues explored. These issues are often not discussed until
after a summary review and discussion of the relevance of the findings. Due
to the retrospective nature of this research, however, and the tendency of
such methodology to be prone to various biases, a frank appraisal of these
potential problems before discussion of findings may answer some questions
before they arise.
One obvious (and intentional) omission of the research was the area of
context.
both

Recall that in Figure 1, interpretation influences response while

issue

characteristics

interpretation.

and

interpretation

context

influence

Variance due to issue characteristics was held constant by

examining a single issue, the trend of increased consumer nutrition
awareness, and its effect on the restaurant industry.

Contextual variables,

however, such as size, strategy, and structure, were not held constant and
might affect the way the issue was interpreted, and hence the response.
While these considerations represent areas of fruitful future research,
they are of no immediate concern in this case due to the particular focus of
this study. The main idea tested was that interpretation influences response
in certain predictable, common ways among different organizations.

It is

very likely, for example, that large restaurant organizations, due to their
greater visibility, would have interpreted this issue differently than would
small restaurant organizations. While this is an important idea, this research
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did not attempt to explore the causes of managerial interpretations, but
rather took them as given and examined the effect they would have on
organizational actions.

The lack of contextual variables or controls in no

way calls into question the basic findings of this research,

that

interpretations, regardless of how they were reached or what may have
influenced their creation, influence response.
An additional concern is the study methodology itself.

The use of

retrospective accounts in management research has been questioned by
some as being problematic (Huber & Power, 1985; Golden, 1992), this being
especially true regarding perceptual data.

The concern is that managers

may not be able to accurately recall events from the not-so-recent past, and
the data they provide would be very noisy. This concern, on its own, would
not represent a significant problem here i f the noise were random. In that
case, it would be assumed that the significance of whatever results emerged
may be attenuated by the noise, but not invalidated. For example, given that
significant findings obtained in this study, one might think that, if the data
were noisy, the results may have been stronger.

These weak results would

not call into the question the validity of the findings that did manage to
emerge amidst the noise.

It may even indicate that the relationships must

have been strong to have emerged as they did with so little statistical power
at hand, though that could only be conjecture.
The primary issue here is not merely that managers may have trouble
recalling past events accurately, but that, when they attempt to do so, various
biases are likely to creep into the process (Schwenk, 1985). In this research,
for example, one might propose that, instead of interpretation affecting
response, the responses implemented and their effects would bias the
recollection of interpretations regarding related past events.

Perhaps a
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manager in a restaurant that implemented few responses to this issue and
which later suffered no ill effect, would attribute a high level of rationality
to their past activities and would, therefore, claim that their level of
understanding was high: "We knew people really didn't care."
The possibility of bias is a serious concern because it might call into
question the validity of this study in a way that mere noisy recollections may
not. Given the nature of the methodology, it is not possible to categorically
dismiss this as a possibility.

Alternative hypotheses concerning bias in

management recall are possible, and so the steps taken to minimize such bias
are reviewed again.
In doing so, it is important to note that none of the authors addressing
this issue concluded that research using retrospective accounts should be
abandoned.

Indeed, there are circumstances and topics that can only be

investigated by using retrospective accounts (Huber & Power, 1985; Golden,
1992). The key is to use retrospective accounts with an awareness of their
limitations and to address them in data collection methodology.
Multi-item scales were employed to measure the interpretation
variables.

These are inherently more reliable than single item scales

(Kerlinger, 1986), such as the single-item strategy scale used in Golden
(1992). More reliable scales are less prone to bias.
Also, before the interpretation items were included on the study
questionnaire, factual questions about the respondent's job position and
duties were asked.

This would "prime" the respondents' recollections by

starting with events and situations they could readily access, following
Boeker (1989).
In addition to the priming questions, a copy of one of Phil Sokolof's
advertisements was included with each questionnaire to increase the
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salience of the issue for the respondent.

Inclusion of this advertisement

would reduce confusion about the events and issues the questionnaire was
about.
The way the questionnaire was constructed also took potential bias into
account.

The interpretation questions were included after the factual

oriented questions were asked and mention was made of the enclosed
advertisement, reversing one common practice of collecting information on
the dependent variable before the independent (Sheatsley, 1983), and for
good reason. Asking respondents initially what responses their organization
took would have heightened the chance that the interpretation data would
have been biased because respondents would have just finished thinking
about what their companies did before being asked about what motivated
them to do it.

It was thought that the risk of the subjective data (the

interpretations) biasing the objective data (either a restaurant implemented
a response or it did not) was much less than the risk of the objective biasing
the subjective.
Beyond consideration concerning question order, it is important to
note that respondents did not provide the final dependent variable data.
These data were the result, in all but 3 cases (MAGNUMBR, IMMYEAR and
IMMONTH), of combining ratings from the expert panel (none of whom were
respondents) with the lists of responses provided by respondents. Basing the
dependent variables, in part, on expert ratings does not eliminate bias, but
may attenuate it compared to what it would have been had respondents been
asked to "Please rate how Active you considered your set of responses to this
issue to have been on a scale from 1 to 5."
It would be unwise to argue that these steps render alternative
hypotheses completely impossible, but they do reduce their likelihood of
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validity, leading to confidence that the results are what they appear to be:
evidence of interpretation influencing response.
Interpretation and Response
A major finding of this study was that the link between interpretation
and response was strongly supported.

The interpretations that executive-

level managers made of the consumer nutrition awareness issue influenced
the manner in which their restaurants responded to it, supporting a strong
body of conceptual and theoretical literature that has been traditionally
somewhat weak on the empirical side.

This study, rather than using a

simulation or doing an in-depth case study of a single organization, used data
from real executives from many organizations facing a real strategic issue.
That such a study could be conducted successfully, even though it addressed
events that were several years in the past, bodes well for continued research
in the area of strategic issue interpretation and response.
The primary focus of this dissertation, however, was not to test
whether interpretation affected response. On the contrary, as can be readily
ascertained from the literature review and hypotheses sections, that
interpretation affected response was taken as a given. Rather, the question
of interest was, which interpretations led to which responses?

Here this

dissertation has made its contribution.
Choice of frameworks. Interpretation could have been operationalized
in one of two ways: the urgency-feasibility approach of Dutton and Duncan
(1987), or the better known and more often used opportunity-threat
framework (Ansoff, 1965; Dutton & Jackson, 1987), or even both. The first
approach was used due to its conceptual clarity and completeness as well as
its relevance to the research issue at hand.

An organization considering

whether to respond to an issue must assess the amount of time, information,
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and resources it has with which to do so. The urgency-feasibility framework
addresses the stock assessments directly, while the opportunity-threat
framework does not. This omission in the opportunity-threat framework is a
significant one, given that, while it contains consideration of the need to
respond, it does not as clearly include consideration of the a b ility to respond.
The urgency-feasibility framework contains both considerations, given that
urgency addresses the need question. Dutton and Duncan (1987) correctly
identified both considerations as important ones in determining how an
organization would respond, as has been shown in this dissertation.
The second framework is not altogether inadequate: on the contrary, it
directly and completely addresses the important consideration of likelihood
of impact and effect on performance (Ansoff, 1980). As such, this research
was not an exhaustive study of the different possible interpretations and
their affect on response.

Including the extra items to measure these

additional constructs, however, would have lengthened what some
respondents considered to be an already long questionnaire (based on
telephone conversations with several executives and managers).

Even so,

the issue of opportunity and threat interpretation could be addressed
indirectly by the urgency-feasibility framework, given that an issue viewed
as urgent and infeasible may be more likely viewed as a threat and vice
versa. Never the less, care should be exercised in drawing such implications
since there is not a one-to-one correspondence between elements in the two
frameworks.
Relevance and importance of findings. Interpretation was shown here
to affect response in a variety of ways.

A quick synopsis of the major

findings is presented first, followed by a more in-depth discussion of each.
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Urgency had the strongest relationship with the response variables.
It had consistently positive and significant relationships with all but
Immediacy.

Understanding, contrary to expectations, was negatively and

significantly related to all the response variables except Immediacy.

The

relationships tended to be curvilinear (concave up), which was also
unexpected.

Capability was measured two ways, globally and by its

components. Global Capability was positively and significantly related to at
least one operationalization of each response variable, except Immediacy.
These positive relationships were hypothesized.

The technological

component of Capability was significantly and positively related to all
response variables, except Immediacy. The organizational component was
significantly and negatively related to both Magnitude and Locus, contrary
to expectations. Thus, different components of Capability had very different
affects on response.

No interpretation variable

had

a significant

relationship with Immediacy.
These findings extend the current level of knowledge in the following
ways.

By investigating an actual strategic issue rather than using a

previously employed artificial research methodology, these findings lead to
greater confidence in the reality of the relationship between interpretation
and response.

The findings related to Urgency's effect demonstrate the

empirical validity of Dutton and Duncan's (1987) arguments concerning that
construct's effect on strategic momentum. Such effects had not previously
been demonstrated using actual "field" data. Capability's effect on response,
found to be significant here, had also not been demonstrated using such data.
The concave-up relationship that Understanding had with the
response variables was unanticipated and opposite of what was hypothesized.
This unexpected finding indicates that not all strategic issues will be
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responded to based on identical relationships between interpretation and
response.

Issue characteristics may not only have a direct effect on

intepretations but may also moderate the effect of interpretation on
response, as well.

This issue-moderation effect has not previously been

addressed.
Another important extension of current knowledge involves the
differential effects of global capability and Capability's components.

While

global Capability's effect on the response dimensions was generally positive,
this effect was duplicated by only one of the four component measures,
Technological Capability.

Beyond this, Organizational Capability had

generally negative effects, the oppositive of what was predicted. Dutton and
Duncan (1987) presented Capability as a monolithic construct, but these
results indicate that doing so may not tell the whole story.

While some

components of Capability may have a positive impact on an organization's
issue responsiveness, others may have the opposite effect of inhibiting such
responsiveness, thus representing core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992).
These

findings

represent

im portant

advancements

in

our

understanding of the interpretation of, and response to, strategic issues.
These findings, and others, are now discussed in greater depth.
The most consistent finding in this research was the effect of urgency
on response.

When managers saw the nutrition issue as urgent their

companies implemented response sets that were larger in magnitude, more
external in focus, and higher in activeness.
hypothesized was that concerning activeness.

The only re la tio n s h ip
One element of Dutton and

Duncan's (1987) formulation of the construct of urgency was visibility. An
issue visible to the public requires a direct, active response. Under the light
of publicity, it was often not possible for restaurants to duck the nutrition
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issue by passive responses that failed to really do something about it.

Of

course, larger companies, particularly the ones named in the advertisements,
would have been more visible in relation to this issue and probably would
have had interpretations of higher urgency. This contextual variable (size)
should be included in future research as it has already been found to
influence issue responsiveness due to greater visibility (Goodstein, 1994).
Similar logic can be used to explain the other urgency results. One
item on the Urgency scale addresses whether an issue will be around for a
long time.

If managers believe it will be long-lasting, then they are more

likely to be willing to commit more time, energy, and resources to
responding to it. Such commitments would lead to larger response sets. Yet
another aspect of urgency as discussed by Dutton and Duncan (1987) is
importance. Important issues are seen as urgent, and this importance would
allow managers to justify the expenditures necessary to implement larger
response sets.
As for Urgency's effect on Locus, visibility may again be an important
factor. Internal responses are not likely to be visible to the public, and even
though the company may have responded to an

issue,

im portant

constituencies may not be aware of the response. A visible, important issue
would have a high level of salience for external stakeholders, and one way
that companies can signal these important groups is to implement external,
not internal, responses.
These last two relationships were not hypothesized, and it is important
not to capitalize on what may be a chance result in theory building and
testing (Neter, et. al., 1985). Never the less, the strength and consistency of
these findings are compelling.

Urgency emerges as the most powerful

interpretational influence on organizational response.

Given its prominent
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position, it would seem to have practical relevance to managers trying to
package and sell issues to top management (Dutton & Ashford, 1993).
Urgency emerged in this study as the most powerful driver of response
magnitude, locus, and activeness. If these response outcomes are desired,
managers can stress the issue's likely longevity, visibility, and time pressure,
not to mention the issue's importance and the need to respond. While some of
these implications seem obvious (importance), some may not be as well
known or salient (issue longevity).

This finding is not only relevant to

managers, but to anyone desiring to influence organizational activities
(lobbyist groups, for example).
Urgency

emerges from this research as more than simply a

consideration of the amount of time available to implement responses. In
future research, it may be important to examine the different aspects of
urgency (visibility, importance, longevity, etc.) to see which components of
urgency are most relevant.

Research along these lines would heighten the

relevance of such research to practitioners.

As it stands, the direct

implication is that to drive organizational action managers should make an
issue seem more urgent. Such advice is nothing new and is probably at too
high a level of aggregation to be of much use. For example, is stressing issue
longevity a more effective motivator to action than visibility? Perhaps the
relative importance of these components of urgency also depends upon issue
characteristics and interpretational context.

If so, how? What are the

relationships?
The second component of Dutton and Duncan's (1987) drivers of
strategic momentum is issue feasibility, hypothesized as having a positive
impact on strategic change. The two components of feasibility tested here
are understanding and capability. Both of these variables were hypothesized
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to have positive correlations with magnitude, locus, and activeness (also
immediacy, to be discussed later). The results here were not as unequivocal
as those concerning Urgency.
For example, the stock assessment of Understanding was not linearly,
positively correlated with any of the three response variables listed above.
The linear component was consistently negative with all three, although not
always significantly. The relationship was also not linear once the squared
term was entered. This squared term had a positive coefficient (statistically
significant in six out of seven regressions) leading to a conclusion that, at
lower levels of understanding, the relationship between understanding and
the response dimensions was negative, but that it turned positive at high
levels of understanding (generally in the top 15% range).

What could

explain this odd result?
It may be that understanding has a threshold kind of impact on
response. Understanding is seen as an assessment of the stock of information
and is, thus, inversely related to uncertainty. At low levels of understanding,
managers might be well aware that they do not have enough information to
be able to respond effectively to an issue, creating an aura of caution that
additional information may only serve to heighten. Managers in companies
with a slightly larger stock of information may not be motivated by this
increased understanding to implement larger, more external, and more
active response sets.

On the contrary, if a wait-and-see attitude prevails

when understanding is low, managers may use the additional information as
a justification for greater caution, due to the generally negative framing of
uncertainty. "We don't know what we should do, and here is all the data that
shows we don't."
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At some level, however, once a threshold level of understanding is
reached, managers in companies with higher levels of understanding are no
longer disturbed by a lack of information but are very confident they have
enough knowledge to act.

This confidence then leads to larger, more

external, more active response sets in companies with additional information
due to the more positive frame these managers put on new information. This
somewhat tortuous logic would explain the pattern obtained.

If this

explanation is true, however, why was the threshold as high as the 85th
percentile? Was it as high as it seemed?
The Understanding scale had six items, and the highest score possible
was a 30.

The mean was 16.27, with a standard deviation of 3.58.

The

minimum of the differential function was generally near 20, at which point
the relationship turned positive. These results indicate that the mean item
response would be around 3.3. On two of the items, therefore, the typical
respondent would have answered at least 4, indicating a recollection of good
understanding (the items were scored so that higher values meant more
understanding).

Such scores do not represent a high assessment of

understanding and may indicate a lack of bias since biased data would
probably include claims to higher levels of understanding than actually
existed (Feldman & March, 1981; Salancik & Meindl, 1984). Thus, the level of
understanding at which the relationship turned positive was not as high as it
might seem because, at that level, respondents still did not claim a very high
level of understanding.
An alternative explanation may lie in the dynamics of this particular
issue.

By 1990, the nutrition awareness trend had been building for some

time, and many restaurants had already responded to it. For example, D'Lites
restaurant operated in the mid-1980s and claimed to have healthier fast food.
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By 1990, however, D'Lites had already closed down, and other restaurants also
had some experience with serving healthy food. Thus, when the 1990 ad blitz
occurred, some in the restaurant industry had already formed an opinion
that the healthy eating trend did not really affect them. This conclusion was
supported by some comments made on returned questionnaires such as,
"Healthy eating is a myth," "People talk lean but eat fat," and "We used hearthealthy symbols. They were the kiss of death."

If this were the case, then

the more restaurant executives believed they understood the issue, the less
compelled they felt to do anything substantial about it, thus explaining the
result in the negative range of Understanding.
Unfortunately, the early experiences of some restaurants with the
nutrition awareness issue does not explain why the relationship would turn
positive at higher levels.

It may be that those companies that were very

confident of their understanding were taking the ads at face value as
indicating a real desire for healthy food in restaurants, a conclusion not
supported by subsequent events (Gibson, 1993).

This suggests the odd

situation of those who do not think they understand responding the most;
those who think they understand more than the first group responding less;
and those who think they understand more than the second but not as much
as the first responding more. Obviously this awkward explanation has some
holes in it.
One possibility is that the type of restaurant, fast food versus sit-down,
for example, would act as a moderator by influencing how well restaurant
executives thought they understood the issue or how a certain level of
understanding would influence response. Data on these variables were not
collected, and thus exploring the impact of restaurant type on understanding
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levels and responses clearly represents a fruitful avenue for future
research.
These results on Understanding do not support the ideas of Dutton &
Duncan (1987) that higher levels of understanding create greater strategic
momentum. It may be that additional variables need to be included to more
fully describe the relationship.
One

important

caveat to note is that the reliability on the

Understanding scale was somewhat low at alpha = .67. This is slightly below
the standard hurdle rate of alpha = .70 set by Nunnally (1978). It may be that
the results, though significant, were influenced by the relatively low
reliability of the Understanding scale. These results should be considered
tentative, therefore, and more definitive conclusions must await additional
investigation using a more reliable measure.
As for the Capability portion of the feasibility assessment, results
showed mixed, though overall favorable, support for its hypothesized
relationships.

Capability was measured in two ways: globally and by its

possible components.

The results using the global measure are discussed

first, followed by the results using the component measures, and then the
relationships between these two sets of measures.
Global Capability was consistently and positively related to Magnitude.
In all three regressions, Capability’s influence on the three different
measures was significant at the .05 level, supporting the assertions of Dutton
and Duncan (1987) and corroborating the similar findings of Chen, et. al.
(1992).
Capability was positively related, but only at a = .10, to just one of the
two measures of locus.

External responses are generally pictured as being

more difficult and requiring a greater amount of available resources than
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internal responses. When a restaurant believed it had enough resources to
respond effectively it was more likely to attempt external responses.
Capability was also positively related to both measures of activeness,
though to one only at the .10 significance level.

A restaurant was more

likely to face an issue squarely rather than avoid it by mere coping
responses if its managers believed it had a strong capability in relation to the
issue.
Taken as a whole, these results are very supportive of the idea that
issue capability assessments are positively related to strategic momentum and
change. Given the increasing importance of strategic change in our society
and the concomitant interest in it in the academic community, these results
may be an important finding (Stewart, 1993; Chakravarthy & Doz, 1992).
Strategic renewal, change, and corporate entrepreneurship may be more
likely to occur in situations where managers are confident of their
organization's overall capability.

Of course, this begs the question, what

influences such confidence? Given the narrow focus of this research, it is
not possible to address this issue. The results do indicate that investigation
that searches for such antecedents to perceptions of capability is a
potentially fruitful pursuit.

Of course, research on what leads to certain

kinds of organizational capabilities has been occurring, most often in the
organizational resources stream (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Hall, 1993;
Peteraf, 1993). This dissertation adds a different twist to this stream by its
focus on interpretations.
In a way, however, some of these issues were addressed here by the
inclusion of component measures of capability.

Drawing from various

strategic management sources, a list of four capability areas was compiled:
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technological, organizational, financial, and human. These results speak to
the question of what particular areas of capability seem to be most relevant.
Technological Capability was positively related to all measures of
Magnitude, Locus, and Activeness, as hypothesized.

The greater the

confidence of an organization's managers in their use and knowledge of
technology, the greater the magnitude, the more external the locus, and the
higher the activeness of that organization's response set. Confidence in the
technology area would probably come from past success at acquiring,
understanding, and using new technologies as they emerged. As such, this
confidence may lead to a willingness to take on riskier ventures, hence the
results obtained in this study.
On the other hand, since the nutrition issue involves the area of
technology in the development and preparation of new menu items, this
result may be idiosyncratic to the particular issue studied, and might not
have broad applicability. For example, technology capability might not have
the same influence on responses to rising wages and the shortage of good
workers. It is also possible that large, external, and active response sets and
technology capability are both influenced by context, for example a
Prospector strategy (Miles & Snow, 1978). A Prospector organization, given
its focus on innovation and entering new markets, would have developed a
strong technological capability and also tend to always respond to emerging
issues in aggressive and proactive ways.

In this case, technological

capability and response would be correlated, but spuriously, given that each
is heavily influenced by strategic orientation.

Future research examining

the generalizability of this finding to other issues and industries would prove
useful, as would investigation of contextual effects.

Research concerning
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the effects of strategy on interpretational activities has begun to address
some of these issues (Jennings & Lumpkin, 1992).
Organization Capability (a confidence in the procedures, systems,
policies, and guidelines of an organization) was negatively related to
Magnitude and Activeness, contrary to expectations. Rather than facilitating
responsiveness to the strategic issue in question, Organization Capability
seemed to inhibit it, leading to smaller and more passive response sets. This
negative relationship between Organization Capability and responsiveness
would tend to support inertia theory that emphasizes the obstacles to
organization change (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Kelley & Amburgey, 1991;
Huff, Huff & Thomas, 1992).

In this case, strong capability in the

organizational area represented a core rigidity, inhibiting responsiveness
and change (Leonard-Barton, 1992).

It may be that confidence in certain

present capabilities, in this case structural and systems ones, may inhibit
change rather than facilitate it, as suggested by Dutton and Duncan (1987).
That previous strengths can hinder future change was the argument of
Starbuck, Greve, and Hedberg (1978), as they emphasized how past success
can lead to future failure. The literature on strategic momentum and change
(Miller & Friesen 1980; Tushman, Newman, & Romanelli, 1986) also adds
insight here. Since change is disruptive, organizations tend to change only
when there is a significant need to do so, and then they tend to make large
changes because the accumulated pressure to do so requires it. The managers
think that since things are running so smoothly, why change them?
Both Financial and Human Capability failed to achieve significance in
any regression.

Financial Capability was consistently negatively correlated

with the response variables, and Human was consistently positively
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correlated, but since the effects were relatively small and insignificant no
implications can be drawn.
Given the manner in which different components of capability
affected response, one potential avenue for future research is to examine the
impact on organizational response of different aspects of capability.
Organization and Financial capability consistently had negative regression
coefficients while Technological and Human capability consistently had
positive ones, although only Organization and Technological w ere
significant.

Would results similar to these be found if different issues or

industries were studied? Such findings would increase our understanding of
how organizational resources affect strategic issue response and strategic
change. It may be that strengths in different resource areas will have even
opposite impacts and this may vary in different contexts.
The hypotheses involving the interaction effects of the stock
assessments were not supported. These interactions were all negatively, not
positively, correlated with response Activeness and one interaction, that of
Urgency (RS) and Capability was statistically significant.

Given the scoring

of the Urgency variable, the negative correlation indicated a positive
interaction effect.

When Urgency is high, Capability has a stronger effect

on Activeness and vice versa.

High Urgency may sensitize managers to

prepare for active responses. In this environment of heightened awareness
and readiness, Capability has a stronger effect.

Likewise, when there is a

high assessment of Capability, managers think they are able to respond
actively to an issue, and so Urgency has a stronger motivational effect in this
situation, as well. These findings are the opposite of what one would expect
had threat rigidity (Staw, et. al., 1981) been operating. In this case, stronger
Urgency would have weakened the effect of Capability. In urgent situations,
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Capability would not have much of an impact on how active the response set
would be since the managers' reaction would be one of avoidance,
justification, and passivity.
Some other interactions were significant although no hypotheses had
been posited concerning them.

The Urgency with Capability and Urgency

with Understanding interactions had a positive effect in one of the three
Magnitude equations. The interpretation is similar to that of Activeness. The
restaurants in this sample, in responding to the nutrition awareness issue,
seemed to have reacted in a rational manner insofar as the interaction terms
could detect. Most of the interaction terms were not significant, however.
None of the hypotheses related to Response Immediacy were
supported. It did not seem to matter at all whether the stock assessments were
high or low along any of the three interpretation dimensions: there was no
effect on how early a company seemed to respond to the issue of nutrition
awareness.

This result may have obtained because these variables do not

actually have any affect on immediacy.

Unfortunately,

a different,

methodological, consideration is very important here.
The issue of consumer nutrition awareness did not appear suddenly in
the spring of 1990 as this research methodology presumes. By 1990, some
restaurant companies had already responded to the consumer nutrition
awareness trend in some way, and hence had very early responses to it, and
low scores on immediacy (the earlier the response the lower the score).
These companies, for example, may not have rated the issue as being very
urgent in 1990 since they had already been dealing with it, some of them for
quite some time. As such, the test of this hypothesis turned out not to be a
very strong one.
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For a better test of the immediacy hypothesis, it would be necessary to
use an issue that emerged more suddenly and with less warning.

As

previously noted, just because no one had made a strong, public connection
between nutrition concerns and eating out at restaurants before Phil
Sokolof's advertisements did not mean that restaurant executives were
unaware of this trend or that they had not already responded to it.

The

opportunities for such responses muddied the data to such an extent that, if
relationships did exist between the stock assessments and immediacy, the
signal was swallowed up in the noise.
The possibilities of such a test remain promising, given that both
Urgency and Understanding had the anticipated negative coefficients (given
that smaller values of Immediacy indicated earlier responses). A test using
an issue having better timing characteristics perhaps would uncover
significant results, as have other studies that have examined response timing
(for example, MacMillan, et. al., 1985; Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Chen, et. al.,
1992).
Additional future research. Research using different strategic issues is
needed to broaden the applicability of this dissertation's findings. Given that
this research examined one particular issue in one particular industry, it
may be that these results will not have much generalizability.

It cannot be

known if they do without additional studies in different industries with
different issues.

Such research should also involve studies that include

multiple issues in one industry.

In this way, the affect of different issue

characteristics on interpretation and response, which were held constant in
this study, could be ascertained.

Such characteristics as suddenness of

emergence, the legitimacy attainable from conforming, how many areas of
the organization are affected, the degree of constituent multiplicity, the
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degree of dependence on relevant constituents, and the degree of
consistency of the issue's demands with organizational goals (Oliver, 1991)
could be ascertained for each issue. These characteristics could be assessed
by an expert panel as was used here, and the relative effects of these
characteristics tested against one another.

Such a study could only be

feasible if a few firms were selected and intensive access were allowed to
investigators since the data collection would probably be time consuming.
Also, more refined or different measures would be needed, given an
executive's likely reluctance to answer similar questions about different
issues several times.
Industry effects were also held constant in this study.

While not

mentioned explicitly in the model, it may be that consolidation, profitability
levels, rivalry, threat of substitution, threat of entry, and the power of
buyers and suppliers (Porter, 1980), to name some of the possibilities, may
affect the way organizational managers interpret and respond to strategic
issues.

In this case, an issue that had very broad applicability, such as a

change in a federal law or regulation (e.g., Americans With Disabilities Act
or health care reform), could be selected and companies from various
industries surveyed.

If such research included firm-level contextual

information, the topic of the relative impact of firm versus industry factors,
long of interest in industrial organization (Schmalensee, 1985; Rumelt, 1991),
could be addressed in the managerial interpretation arena.
There is also a host of firm-level variables that could have an impact
on the interpretation-response relationship.

These include age, size,

strategy, structural characteristics, types of scanning systems, performance,
top management team characteristics: the list is quite long. Research on how
managerial cognitions influence strategy and other firm-level phenomena
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is common (Barr, Stimpert, & Huff, 1992; Reger & Huff, 1993).

Research

investigating effects in the opposite direction should be continued, as well.
Also of interest in managerial interpretation is the influence of
individual characteristics (Schneider & de Meyer, 1991).

Research has

shown that age, educational background, personal experiences, and
functional orientation of managers have an impact on the strategies their
companies are likely to employ and the financial performance they are
likely to attain (Miller & Toulouse, 1986; Norburn, 1989).

Tendencies of

certain types of individuals toward certain types of interpretations may act
as a mediative step in this relationship. Such research could extend to how
individual differences (such as personality, age, gender) may affect
interpretations.
One methodological improvement that could be made is to research an
issue or issues of more recent vintage.

While the company-level response

rate was adequate, the individual one was lower, as was expected. Executives
are probably more likely to provide information about recent events than
ones less recent for the reasons of salience, interest, and ease of recall.
Given the lead-times involved with dissertation research, the time factor was
somewhat unavoidable in this case. This should not be the case in future
endeavors.

A good approach would be being prepared to act quickly with

data collection for an "issue of opportunity." Questionnaires could be mailed
early in an issue's evolution and the respondents later asked what they did in
response.
Additional areas of relevance. This research has the potential for
applicability to a wide arena of research streams. For example, Hall's (1984)
"retained set" idea, within the context of the model delineated in this
dissertation, relates very strongly to the idea of emergent strategies
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(Mintzberg & Waters, 1985) and the work in what has been termed the
"learning school" of strategy formation (Mintzberg, 1990).

It has been

shown empirically that issue interpretation influences responses to new
issues arising in the environment, and these responses represent the
emergent aspects of what ends up being the realized strategy.

It is thus

possible to begin to understand the important factors in the formation of
emergent strategies. Further research examining the influences of context,
as has been suggested here, would go a long way toward bolstering our
knowledge of such processes.
Research in the corporate social responsibility area may also be
informed by these results. Factors that tend to increase or decrease corporate
responsiveness to social needs are of interest here (Goodstein, 1994). This
dissertation examined how organizations in one industry responded to the
social concern of serving food that is healthier for consumers

and

demonstrated how interpretations of this issue influenced how they
responded to it.
Given the importance of interpretation (opportunity versus threat) in
most traditional strategic management models (Digman, 1986), these results
also inform the areas of strategy-making and decision-making.

Strategic

control involves tracking premise validity and maintaining v ig ila n t
surveillance for environmental trends (Schreyogg & Steinmann, 1987).
These results may form part of a descriptive model of these processes.
Conclusion
Organizations must respond to strategic issues, social issues,
competitive moves, crises, and institutional pressures.

Understanding what

influences the kinds of responses that organizations enact provides
knowledge about an important area of strategic management and social
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responsibility.

While many influences on organizational responses have

been suggested, this dissertation has specifically examined the impact that
issue interpretation has on organizational response by investigating how
different restaurant organizations interpreted the issue of increased
nutritional awareness in the spring of 1990 and what relationships these
differing interpretations had on the responses that organizations made. In
this way, interpretation has been highlighted as an important mediational
step between the monitoring and scanning of the environment and taking
action in response to it, a basic management activity.
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Appendix A - Glossary of Key Terms

Issue Capability - estimates of whether the organization has sufficient
resources to adequately respond to a strategic issue.
Issue Response - the organizational reaction to a particular strategic
issue.
Issue Understanding - the degree of confidence the organization has
that it knows or can determine an appropriate response to a particular
strategic issue.
Issue Urgency - the cost of doing nothing in response to a strategic
issue and how important it is for the organization to respond.
Response Activeness - the extent that the response deals with the
actual issue or evades the issue through justification, denial, or other
protective responses.
Response Assets - factors that an organization needs to be able to
formulate a functional response to a particular strategic issue.
Response Certainty - the degree of understanding an organization has
concerning the alternative actions it can take and the effectiveness of each
of the alternatives.
Response Immediacy - the amount of time elapsed between the data
interpretation and response stages.
Response Locus - the degree to which the response is internal or
external.
Response Magnitude - the extent of the change or the degree the
response might be considered revolutionary.
Strategic Issues - emerging developments that can have a major
impact on the organization's strategy
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Strategic Issue Management (SIM) - the broad-based monitoring of the
environment where strategic issues are interpreted, analyzed, and responded
to.
Strategic Issue Management System - that part of an organization that
perceives, analyzes, and responds to strategic issues.
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Appendix B - The Organizational Informant Scales

Issue Urgency Scale
This is an issue that our organization must respond to.
This is an urgent issue.
This issue will be around for a long time.
There is very little time pressure associated with this responding to this
issue. RS
This issue is very visible to the public.
This is not a very important issue. RS
This issue could develop into a crisis for our organization.
We must take action quickly to resolve this issue.

Issue Understanding Scale
It is hard to understand which alternative response is likely to be most
effective in the long run. RS
I don't think that we are aware of all the response alternatives available to
us. RS
There are many unknowns that could influence our response. RS
We understand this issue.
To some extent we just have to guess which alternative will produce the most
desirable outcome for our organization. RS
It is easy to determine exactly which response alternatives are available.
It is relatively easy to evaluate the impact of each response alternative on
the long-run well-being of our organization.
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Global Capability Scale
We have enough resources to be able to respond effectively to this issue.
Due to a lack of resources, we are restricted in the kinds of responses we can
make. RS
Our organization's capability gives us a broad range of response options.
The most effective responses are beyond our organization's capability. RS
Sufficient resources exist for our organization to have great latitude as to
which alternative response(s) we can implement.
Our organization is capable of responding effectively to this issue.
Since our organization has many resources, we can respond to this issue
pretty much as we want to.

Component Capability Scale
Please indicate the degree to which you think each of the following
represented a strength or a weakness during this period.
- Financial Subscale
Our organization's cash flow.
Our organization's capacity to take on more debt.
The availability of new equity financing.
The amount of cash and liquid assets our organization has on hand.
- Organization Subscale
Our organization's reputation.
The administrative procedures of our organization.
Our organization's administrative systems.
The management techniques used by our organization.
Our organization's operational policies and guidelines.
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- Human Resource Subscale
The training and/or experience of our organization's managers and workers.
The relationship between our organization and our franchisees.
The motivation of our organization's managers and workers.
The working relationships of our organization's managers and workers.
- Technology Subscale
Our organization's ability to develop new and/or innovative methods to serve
our customers.
The usage of new technology in the design and operation of our restaurants.
Our organization's proprietary information.
Our organization's skill at taking advantage of new technology and
innovation.
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Appendix C - The Expert Questionnaire

During the mid- to late-1980s and the early 1990s, the American public
became increasingly concerned with health. Part of this concern was
reflected in a heightened interest in nutrition. Since the food offered
by some restaurants has been traditionally perceived as unhealthy by
many people, this increased interest in nutrition represented an issue
that many restaurant companies, especially the fast-food ones,
thought they must respond to.
Below is a list of hypothetical responses that restaurant chains could have
implemented at the chain level in reaction to the nutrition trend. You
are being asked to rate each of these responses as to its degree of
responsiveness, its focus (external or internal), and its magnitude.

What follows is a brief description of what the terms responsiveness, focus.
and magnitude mean.
Responsiveness - refers to whether or not the response directly addresses
the nutrition issue and can vary between direct and indirect. A direct
response deals squarely and straightforwardly with the nutrition
issue, while an indirect response avoids the real issue or deals with it
in a passive manner.

For example, in the case of the Tylenol

poisonings, a direct response would have been to pull all bottles of
Tylenol off store shelves, while an indirect response would have been
to announce the formation of a blue-ribbon panel to study the
psychology of random poisonings.
Focus - refers to the area that the response targets for activity and can vary
between internal and external.

Internal responses make changes
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inside the organization while external responses make changes
outside it.

For example, in the case of the Exxon-Valdez oil spill, an

internal response would have been to tighten up Exxon's monitoring
of oil rig captains, while an external response would have been to run
advertisements stressing the company's otherwise outstanding safety
record.
Magnitude - refers to the size and cost of the response in terms of resources
and can vary between small & inexpensive and large & costly.

For

example, in the case of possible defects with a new automobile's gas
cap, a large and expensive response would be to recall all the affected
cars and to replace the gas caps, while a small and inexpensive
response would be to mail customers a notice of the problem with
instructions of how they could fix it themselves.
What follows is a description of what the numbers 1 through 4 correspond to
for each of the response characteristics: responsiveness, focus, and
magnitude.

R esponsiveness

Focus

M a g n itu d e

1

2

3

4

Indirect

Somewhat

Somewhat

Direct

Indirect

Direct

Somewhat

Somewhat

Internal

External

Small &

Somewhat

Somewhat

Large &

Inexpensive

Small &

Large &

Costly

Inexpensive

Costly

Internal

External

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

154
Responsiveness - direct deals squarely with the issue, indirect avoids the
issue.
Focus - internal: changes inside the organization, external: changes outside
it.
Magnitude - refers to the size and cost of the response in terms of resources.

For each possible response, please circle the number that best describes the
degree of responsiveness, focus, and magnitude vou think the
response has. Please answer thoughtfully and consider each of them
as occurring at the chain le v e l.
Introduce a new, healthier product
Responsiveness

12 3 4

Focus

12 3 4

Magnitude

12 3 4

Use advertisements showing how healthy the food already is
Provide nutrition information for customers
Use advertisements showing how healthy the food is compared to competitors
Increase R&D budget to develop healthier items
Form a committee to study the nutrition issue
Run ads contesting perceptions that the food is unhealthy
Offer more food that is perceived to be lower in fat (i.e., chicken vs. beef)
Increase the budget of the public relations office
Spend more resources to identify consumer eating trends
Cut the price of items that may be perceived as unhealthy
Increase the price of items that are perceived as healthy
Broaden food offerings (e.g., hamburger restaurant opens salad bar)
Donate money to promote public nutrition awareness
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Do not change product offerings because nutrition is not an important issue
with customers
Adjust profit forecasts
Run ads showing the non-nutrition benefits of fast food
Change names of items to make them sound healthier
Discontinue advertising higher-fat items
Discontinue serving higher fat items
Report to shareholders/owners that difficult times may lie ahead
Study feasibility of opening a healthier-menu fast food store
Begin to poll franchisees more often for market information
Merge or acquire another fast-food restaurant
Seek a buyer for the business
Communicate need for changes to franchisees
Test market healthier menu ideas
Begin to offer lower-fat items not offered before (e. g. lower-fat desserts yogurt)
Increase advertising on items perceived to be unhealthy to increase sales
Offer sales on items higher in fat
Increase expansion in areas not as affected by nutrition issue
Stress superiority of cooking method used over that of competitors
Change production methods to reduce fat content in food
Test market items with lower-fat ingredients
Increase resources used for market intelligence
Copy competitors successful ad campaign or product roll-out
Run ads showing food items being consumed by active people who work-out
Introduce healthier reformulation of existing product
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Appendix D - Cover Letter

We are engaged in some exciting research involving the restaurant
industry. After working with restaurateurs during the last twelve years we
have developed a master list of special restaurant executives to participate in
a major restaurant research activity. Our advisors have nominated you and
your organization to be a part of this special project.

Our expert panel of restaurateurs, together with our faculty, have
helped develop the enclosed questionnaire. This questionnaire is concerned
with basic management practices and activities of special restaurant owners
here in the United States.

We are asking you (and the other recommended executives) to
complete this questionnaire and return it to us by March 18, 1994. The
confidential questionnaire will take only about twenty minutes to complete.
(No individual responses will ever be reported - only the total group
responses will be combined and analyzed.)

Thank you very much for your assistance and participation.

Sincerely,
Robert T. Justis
Professor
Scott D. Julian
Research Associate
Encl. - study questionnaire, SASE
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Appendix E - Organizational Informant Questionnaire, Page 1

Organizational Responses to Consumer Nutrition Awareness
Questionnaire

In the spring and summer of 1990 an organization called the National
Heart Savers Association (NHSA) ran a series of aggressive advertisements
aimed at several restaurants in the fast-food industry. A copy of one of these
ads is included for your examination (see attachment A). The purpose of the
NHSA's campaign was to heighten consumer's nutrition awareness and to get
the fast-food industry to offer healthier menu selections.

A lthou gh

consumers had been increasingly aware of nutritional concerns for years,
the NHSA campaign brought this issue to the forefront.
This questionnaire is designed to capture your organization's
impressions of the consumer nutrition awareness issue during the spring
and summer of 1990 and what actions your organization has subsequently
taken in response to it.

The questionnaire has four parts: A) General

Information, B) Impressions of the Nutrition-Awareness Issue, C) Your
Organization, and D) Actions Taken in Response to the Issue.

A) General Information - Please write the answers to the following questions
in the spaces provided. Please be assured that a ll of your answers will be
kept completely confidential.

1) What was your position in the company in the spring and summer of 1990?

2) What were your job duties in this position?
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3) How would you characterize your company's performance in the spring
and summer of 1990?

Were sales and profits increasing, stagnant, or

decreasing? How was your performance in relation to your competitors?

4) What trends and issues were affecting the restaurant industry in the
spring and summer of 1990?

5) What opportunities and threats was your particular company facing in the
spring and summer of 1990?
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Appendix F - Strategic Issue Response
Implementation Frequency (n = 89)
Response Description

Frequency

Introduce a new, healthier product
Offer more food that is perceived to be lower in fat (i.e.,
chicken vs. beef)
Begin to offer lower-fat items not offered before (e. g. lowerfat desserts - yogurt)
Test market healthier menu ideas
Broaden food offerings (e.g., hamburger restaurant opens
salad bar)
Test market items with lower-fat ingredients
Provide nutrition information for customers
Advertisements showing how healthy food already is
Increase R&D budget to develop healthier items
Change production methods to reduce fat content in food
Spend more resources to identify consumer eating trends
Introduce healthier reformulation of existing product
Increase resources used for market intelligence
Communicate need for changes to franchisees
Form a committee to study the nutrition issue
Stress superiority of cooking method used over that of
competitors
Increase the budget of the public relations office
Merge or acquire another fast-food restaurant
Begin to poll franchisees more often for market information
Use advertisements showing how healthy the food is compared
to competitors
Do not change product offerings because nutrition is not an
important issue with customers
Adjust profit forecasts
Study feasibility of opening a healthier-menu fast food store
Change names of items to make them sound healthier
Copy competitors successful ad campaign or product roll-out
Increase the price of items that are perceived as healthy
Increase expansion in areas not as affected by nutrition issue
Increase advertising on items perceived to be unhealthy to
increase sales
Run ads showing food items being consumed by active people
who work-out
Discontinue serving higher fat items
Donate money to promote public nutrition awareness
Seek a buyer for the business
Run ads contesting perceptions that the food is unhealthy
Cut the price of items that may be perceived as unhealthy
Run ads showing the non-nutrition benefits of fast food
Discontinue advertising higher-fat items
Offer sales on items higher in fat

71
70
58
55
52
49
46
37
36
33
33
27
25
24
21
21
18
17
16
14
14
14
12
11
10
10
8
8
7
7
7
5
4
3
2
2
1
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Appendix G - Classification of Responses
Using the Expert Median Scores
Frequency
Magnitude
Large
Small
Not Classified

8
8
22

Locus
External
Internal
Not Classified

20
8
10

Activeness
Active
Passive
Not Classified

18
8
12

All subsections of the right column
sum to 38.
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